Everything in Its Right Place: Social Cooperation and Artist Compensation by Belsky, Leah et al.
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
Volume 17 | Issue 1
2010
Everything in Its Right Place: Social Cooperation
and Artist Compensation
Leah Belsky
Yale Law School Information Society Project
Byron Kahr
Max Berkelhammer
University of Colorado Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Studies
Yochai Benkler
Harvard Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the
Internet Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Leah Belsky, Byron Kahr, Max Berkelhammer & Yochai Benkler, Everything in Its Right Place: Social Cooperation and Artist
Compensation, 17 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 1 (2010).
Available at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mttlr/vol17/iss1/1







Cite as: Leah Belsky, Byron Kahr, Max Berkelhammer and
Yochai Benkler, Everything in Its Right Place: Social
Cooperation and Artist Compensation,
17 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2010),
available at http://www.mttlr.org/volseventeen/belsky.pdf
The music industry's crisis response to the Internet has been
the primary driver of U.S. copyright policy for over a decade.
The core institutional response has been to increase the scope
of copyright and the use of litigation, prosecution, and techni-
cal control mechanisms for its enforcement. The assumption
driving these efforts has been that without heavily-enforced
copyright, artists will not be able to make a living from their
art. Throughout this period artists have been experimenting
with approaches that do not rely on technological or legal en-
forcement, but on constructing web-based business models that
engage fans and rely on voluntary compliance and payment
mechanisms. Anecdotal reports of such efforts have occasion-
ally surfaced in the media. Here we present the first extensive
sales-data evidence, gleaned from hundreds of thousands of
t 'Everything in its Right Place' is the title of a Radiohead song. It can be found on
Kid A, the group's 2000 album.
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online voluntary transactions, from three web-based efforts over
a period of several years. This Article examines the effectiveness
of these voluntary models as compared to the baseline-forcing
system advocated by the industry and adopted and enforced by
Congress and successive U.S. administrations over the past fif-
teen years.
Platforms for artist-fan cooperation are complex and dynamic
systems, sensitive to a variety of design factors that can either
increase participation and prosocial behavior or dampen
participation and enable anti-social behavior In addition to
providing substantial evidence for copyright policy, our study
reports field observations of the design characteristics that
support cooperation. A growing literature experimentally and
theoretically explores prosocial behavior that signtifcantly and
systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis characterizing
most rational actor modeling. This literature has not yet been
translated into a design approach aimed specifically at
designing systems of cooperation.
Building on experimental and theoretical literature in diverse
fields of behavioral sciences, we synthesize a series of design
levers that should improve the degree to which individuals coop-
erate. We then specify how these design levers might be
translated into specific user interface features, describe the ways
in which these design levers have been utilized in the sites under
study, and present hypotheses about additional features that
could improve cooperative outcomes.
The Article contributes to the Internet copyright policy debates
by offering empirical evidence showing that well-designed vol-
untary cooperation models compare favorably to more
aggressive and widely criticized enforcement policies based on
copyright law and the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. It pro-
vides an empirical foundation for challenging the guiding
assumptions of those policies.
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INTRODUCTION
Making a living as a musician has never been more complicated. The
Internet's near total eclipse of the media environment, along with ad-
vances in recording technologies, have drastically reduced the cost of
recording and distributing music. As a result, more musicians than ever
are able to realize their vision without relying on the mainstream music
industry's traditional filtering role. Meanwhile, the major record labels
continue their long decline amidst falling CD sales and only modest suc-
cess with alternative models. Music fans are increasingly accustomed to
consuming music without paying for it, via streaming content,
downloading from file-sharing networks, or copying from friends.' In
short, long-standing structures for artist compensation are collapsing at
1. See Jon Pareles, 1,700 Bands, Rocking as the CD Industry Reels, N.Y. TIMES,
March 15, 2008, at Al ("In an era of plummeting CD sales and short shelf lives even for cur-
rent hit makers, the [South by Southwest Music Festival] is full of people seeking ways to
route their careers around what's left of the major recording companies.").
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just the moment when new possibilities for production and distribution
2have emerged.
In the face of all this change, both media companies and musicians
themselves are cultivating new models for distributing recorded music,
often bypassing established intermediaries to engage directly with con-
sumers. A variety of models have emerged, each seeking to monetize the
dissemination of digital music, and in so doing, provide artists with a
stable stream of revenue.
Cooperative models-approaches to the sale and distribution of mu-
sic that rely on voluntary contributions and other forms of prosocial fan
behavior-are beginning to appear in many different forms.' World fa-
mous bands and relative unknowns alike have experimented with
cooperative models, authorizing fans to download music without paying
for it, but appealing to fans' sense of generosity, community or obliga-
tion in asking for voluntary contributions. Some artists are appealing
directly to fans to raise the funds necessary for recording and distributing
new material. Entrepreneurs have launched new business models de-
signed to harness the power of cooperative fan behavior, providing artists
with platforms for engaging their fans' goodwill. Indeed, the basic logic
of the tip jar is emerging in many forms, with models evincing a range of
sophistication and ambition.
This Article analyzes three such models-Magnatune.com, Jonathan-
Coulton.com, and Sheeba.ca-. All three enable artist-fan cooperation.
Their approaches range from allowing flexible pricing schemes and volun-
tary payments to enabling fan-driven promotion and distribution. We
begin by describing the range of currently operating cooperative models
2. For an overview of the broad range of new models for the distribution of music
(most of them digital), see Henry H. Perritt, Jr., New Architectures for Music: Law Should
Stay Out of the Way, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 259 (2007).
3. For example, Last.FM and Rhapsody provide access to a library of music for
streaming, and rely on either ad sales (Last.FM) or subscription sales (Rhapsody) for revenue.
The most successful and well-known model is Apple's iTunes online music store. A competi-
tor, eMusic, offers a fixed number of downloads per month for a subscription fee. See Most
Frequently Asked Questions, EMUSic, http://www.emusic.com/help/index.html (last visited
Nov. 21, 2010). Last.FM (a CBS subsidiary), an early adopter of the free streaming funded by
advertising dollars model, currently provides a catalogue of over 3.5 million songs. See Saul
Hansell, Last.FM Has a First with Streaming Music, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Jan. 23, 2008,
10:45 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/01/23/lastfm-is-first-with-streaming-music-
users-choose/.
4. Business models relying on prosocial fan behavior are not entirely new. See, e.g.,
Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us About
Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651 (2006) (identifying
prosocial norms founded on notions of reciprocity functioning in fan communities associated
with jambands (i.e., the Grateful Dead and its progeny)).
5. Sheeba.ca was formerly an online music store run by the musician Jane Siberry.
Siberry now permits fans to download her music for free.
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for music distribution. Next, we describe the sales data from each of the
three sites under study, and consider the extent to which these alternative
models can be deemed successful-from the standpoint of the artists-
when compared against baseline industry revenues. After establishing
that the revenues generated by these models are substantial, we then de-
scribe each site's basic approach and analyze the ways in which each
enables cooperation.
Our analysis is driven by a recognition that platforms for artist-fan
cooperation are complex and dynamic systems sensitive to a variety of
design factors that can either increase participation and prosocial behav-
ior or dampen participation and enable anti-social behavior. That is to
say, the success of cooperative models depends not just on music con-
sumers' relative virtue; the models' design features matter a great deal.
What design features will work to increase prosocial behavior, and why,
is not well addressed within mainstream economic theory anchored in
universal self-interest. If homo economicus adequately captured human
behavior, individuals would never pay for music they could get without
paying. And yet, they do. To understand this behavior, we need a more
nuanced model of human motivation and behavior.
The past fifteen years have seen the emergence of a rich literature,
across many fields of research, analyzing human cooperation theoreti-
cally, experimentally, and observationally. From this work we can begin
to synthesize an approach to designing institutional, technical, and or-
ganizational interventions that harness prosocial motivations and social
dynamics to the goal of sustaining human cooperation.
By "cooperation," we mean deviation from the predictions of selfish
rationality in ways that contribute to the well-being of others or the pro-
visioning of public goods. Thus, to cooperate is to undertake a cost to
contribute voluntarily to the provisioning of a public good-the creation
and distribution of music. And by "public good," we mean here the tech-
nical economic term: a good that is both non-rival in consumption, and,
in this case, also non-excludable. In our case studies, the cooperators or
prosocial actors are fans who contribute time and money to artists whose
work they enjoy, even though they could get the music for free through
other channels. In the case of the artists we study, fans could do so le-
gally, because the music is either entirely free and unencumbered by
copyright protection, or licensed under a Creative Commons license that
makes redistribution among fans legal." The cooperation problem we
study here is particularly challenging because there is no effective
6. For a general discussion of how such licenses work, see Molly Shaffer Van Hou-
weling, Cultural Environmentalism and the Constructed Commons, LAW & CONTEMP.
PRoBs., Spring 2007, at 23.
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mechanism for excluding third parties from benefiting from the public
good at issue, and there are no mechanisms to enforce reciprocity among
contributors.
We introduce a series of design levers that, based on underlying re-
search on cooperation, should improve the degree to which individuals
cooperate. We then specify how these design levers might be translated
into specific user interface features, describe the ways in which these
design levers have been utilized in the sites under study, and present hy-
potheses regarding additional features that could improve cooperative
outcomes.
As a matter of policy, our goal here is not to identify new legal rules
or system design aspects intended to save the recording industry or as-
sure its revenue model. Rather, the policy question our analysis responds
to is whether voluntary donations can play a substantial role in putting
artists in a position that is not systematically worse, in terms of their
ability to expect to make a living from their art, than under the old sys-
tem. Our tentative answer is yes: voluntary donations, particularly when
the lessons of well-designed sites are refined over time, do provide a
pathway for artists to keep body and soul together while pursuing their
art.
The Article's main policy implication is to caution against blunt pol-
icy interventions aimed at "saving" the recording industry's lucrative, but
now obsolete, twentieth-century business model.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF VOLUNTARY PAYMENT AS
A MODE OF ARTIST COMPENSATION
We begin by canvassing the range of cooperative models for the sale
and distribution of music that emerged in the last three years alone. This
Part does not offer a comprehensive review-new models are emerging
all the time-but instead attempts to document an increasingly common
phenomenon in the music marketplace.
7. The underlying research for these design levers includes Yochai Benkler, Law,
Policy, and Cooperation, in GOVERNMENT AND MARKETS: TOWARD A NEW THEORY OF
REGULATION 299, 312-23 (Edward J. Balleisen & David A. Moss eds., 2010); Yochai
Benkler, Technology Policy, Cooperation and Human Systems Design, in THE NEw EcONOM-
ICS OF TECHNOLOGY POLicy 337, 343-53 (D. Foray ed., 2009); Yochai Benkler, Beyond the
Bad Man and the Knave: Law and the Interdependence of Motivational Vectors (Mar. 12,
2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/
IntellectualLife/LTW-Benkler.pdf.
8. Many artists are testing the cooperative model waters, providing a robust variety of
examples to analyze and compare. See, e.g., Kristen Nicole, More Bands and Musicians Giv-
ing Away Free Downloads, MASHABLE (Oct. 9, 2007), http://mashable.com/2007/10/09/
radiohead-free-downloads/.
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The most well-known voluntary payment model, unquestionably, is
the release of the British rock group Radiohead's album In Rainbows. In
October 2007, Radiohead released In Rainbows exclusively (for a lim-
ited time) through its website.9 The site permitted fans to select their own
price for a digital download version of the album.'o The sound files were
not encumbered by restrictive code (commonly known as "DRM," short
for "digital rights management"), and fans were permitted to download
the album for free (although a small service charge was required)." Ac-
cording to public statements, the band hoped to sidestep the bloated
record label-wholesaler complex, but beyond the simple economics, the
members of Radiohead also wanted to offer their fans the freedom to
decide for themselves how much the album was worth.12 After nearly
three months, Radiohead disabled the download portal, and proceeded to
release the physical version of the album in the traditional manner.
Radiohead has not released comprehensive sales figures, and appar-
ently does not plan to do So. Market research firms, however, have
offered estimates. One report concluded that nearly two-thirds of
downloaders paid between $5 and $15, with roughly a third electing to
download for free.'" The Internet market research firm comScore re-
ported a less rosy outcome for the band, estimating that 38% of 1.2
million overall downloaders paid for the album, paying an average of $6
per album (and an overall average of $2.26 per album, factoring in those
who downloaded for free).'" Estimates also showed that payment levels
were highly skewed, with a relatively small group of fans (16% of
downloaders) accounting for 80% of the overall revenue.
9. Jeff Leeds, Radiohead to Let Fans Decide What to Pay for Its New Album, N.Y.




13. See The End of the Beginning, RADIOHEAD DEAD AIR SPACE (Dec. 5, 2007),
http://www.radiohead.com/deadairspace/index.php?a=303.
14. In October 2008, the band released sales figures from the In Rainbows release,
including revenues from physical album sales and digital music stores, but declined to break
down album sales by type (i.e., digital or physical), or by the source of the purchase or
download (i.e., iTunes or Radiohead.com). Radiohead "In Rainbows" Sales Data Unveiled,
CURRENT (Oct. 20, 2008), http://current.com/entertainment/music/89428205_radiohead-in-
rainbows-sales-data-unveiled.htm. Aggregating digital and physical album sales, Radiohead
sold three million copies of In Rainbows. The physical album release, in January 2008, en-
tered both the U.S. and U.K. charts at number one, even though the digital version had been
available for almost two months. The album also became available on iTunes in January 2008
and was the most downloaded album of the month, selling 30,000 digital download versions
the first week it was available. See id.
15. See Steven Levy, How Much Is Music Worth?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 29, 2007, at 20.
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Radiohead's distribution scheme triggered a wave of media attention
and scrutiny. Commentators wondered aloud whether direct artist-to-
consumer voluntary payment schemes could replace, or at least provide a
strong supplement to, the music industry's traditional forced payment
methods. Some deemed the venture a success, providing the band with
a direct revenue stream and a per-album profit margin that exceeded by
far what most musicians receive under the terms of a standard recording
industry contract.'9 Many others, however, noted the large percentage of
downloaders who paid nothing (of course, nobody knows exactly how
many-estimates range from 33% to 60%) and concluded that music
consumers are generally selfish and unwilling to contribute money to
finance the music they enjoy.20
Rock musician Trent Reznor (the leader of the band Nine Inch Nails)
and hip-hop artist/spoken word poet Saul Williams released a collabora-
tive record in the fall of 2007, employing a simple variable pricing
scheme.2' Reznor and Williams made the record (entitled The Inevitable
Rise and Liberation of Niggy Tardust) available directly through their
website, without the involvement of a record label. 2  Downloaders could
access either a high quality DRM-free version of the record for $5, or a
slightly lower sound quality version for free. 23 Two months after the re-
lease, Reznor reported on his blog that of the 154,449 people who
downloaded the record, 18.3% chose to pay for it. 24 Reznor expressed
18. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter, Radiohead's Genius?: Making Music Downloading Pay,
N.Y. TIMES BOARD BLOG (Nov. 27, 2007, 11:15 AM), http://theboard.blogs.nytimes.com/
2007/11/27/radioheads-genius-making-music-downloading-pay/. Radiohead disputed the
comScore figures, calling them "wholly inaccurate." See Greg Sandoval, Radiohead Criti-
cized as Band Shuts Down in Rainbows' Promotion, CNET NEWS BLOG (Dec. 11, 2007, 3:12
PM), http://www.news.com/8301-10784 3-9832659-7.html.
19. See, e.g., Steven D. Levitt, How Much Do You Think Paul Feldman Will Pay for
the New Radiohead Album?, N.Y. TIMES FREAKONOMICS BLOG (Oct. 7, 2007, 9:53 AM),
http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/10/02/how-much-do-you-think-paul-feldman-
will-pay-for-the-new-radiohead-album/.
20. See, e.g., Sheila Marikar, Radiohead Lets Fans Set CD Price, Most Say $0, ABC
NEWS (Nov. 6, 2007), http://www.abcnews.go.com/Entertainment/story?id=3826638 (report-
ing on market research data suggesting that 60% of the 1.2 million people who downloaded In
Rainbows in the two weeks after its release paid nothing). But see, e.g., Gordon Haff, People
Do Pay for Music, CNET PERVASIVE DATA CENTER BLOG (Nov. 7, 2007, 5:31 AM),
http://www.cnet.com/8301-13556_1-9812667-61.htmi (reviewing and criticizing mainstream
media reporting that deemed Radiohead fans "freeloaders" and the In Rainbows experiment a
failure).
21. See Trent Reznor, Saul Follow-up and Facts, NINE INCH NAILS-NIN.COM BLOG &
MEDIA ARCHIVE (Jan. 3, 2008, 1:04 PM), http://ninblogs.wordpress.com/2008/01/03/saul-
follow-up-and-facts/. Reznor and Williams have since removed the free download option,
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some disappointment with the sales figures, explaining that the large
percentage of downloaders that chose not to pay left him "dis-
hearten[ed]."2
Reznor's better known musical project, Nine Inch Nails ("NIN"),
structured their most recent album release differently. NIN offered the
full thirty-six song version of their album Ghosts I-IV for download
through their website, without DRM and in a high quality format, for
$5.26 NIN also allowed fans to access a nine song abridged version of the
album for free, and made available a variety of higher cost limited edi-
tion physical copies of the record.2 ' Reznor reported receiving
$1,619,420 in revenue from 781,917 online transactions in the week af-
ter the Ghosts I-IV release." NIN followed up with an entirely free
digital album release (entitled The Slip) in May 2008, which Reznor de-
scribed as a "thank you" to his loyal fans. 29 The band released the album
under a Creative Commons license, encouraging fans to download and
share.30
Reznor continues to explore the possibilities of fan-artist collabora-
tion, converting the NIN website into a platform for file sharing,
remixing, and facilitating fan-to-fan communication. Fans have pro-
duced thousands of remix versions of NIN songs (all available for free
download), uploaded photos, videos, and set list archives (over 30,000
free photos and videos, all produced and uploaded by fans), and even
volunteered as moderators to facilitate message boards and other website
25. Id. Chris Anderson, author of The Long Tail, found Reznor's disappointment curi-
ous. He notes that Reznor and Williams earned more from the digital Niggy Tardust release
than they would have from a traditional physical release. Reznor reported that 28,232 people
paid $5 for the album, and the remainder downloaded the free version. That amounts to
$141,610 in revenue. Williams's previous record (released through a label in 2004), sold
33,897 copies. Anderson points out that, assuming Williams's 2004 release was covered by a
typical record deal, he earned around $1.60 per album, for a total of $54,235. Thus, even with
over 80% of downloaders downloading for free, Williams did well. Chris Anderson, How Not
to Do a FREE Calculation, Trent Reznor Edition, THE LONG TAIL (Jan. 3, 2008, 10:52 PM),
http://www.longtail.com/the-long-tail/2008/01/how-not-to-do-I.html.
26. See Order Options, NINE INCH NAILS: GHOSTS 1-IV, http://ghosts.nin.comlmain/
order-options (last visited Sept. 11, 2010).
27. Id.
28. Daniel Kreps, Nine Inch Nails' "Ghosts I-IV" Makes Trent Reznor an Instant Mil-
lionaire, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 13, 2008), http://www.rollingstone.com/music/news/
13511/70878.
29. E.g., Nine Inch Nails - The Slip, NIN.com, http://dl.nin.com/theslip/signup (last
visited Sept. 12, 2010).
30. Id.
31. See Frank Rose, Nine Inch Nails iPhone App Extends Reznor's Innovative Run,
WIRED UNDERWIRE BLOG (Apr. 6, 2009, 4:41 PM), http://www.wired.com/underwire/
2009/04/trent-reznor-wa/ ("[Reznor's] embrace of 'freemium' pricing, torrent distribution, fan
remixes, and social media seem to be paying off financially even as they have helped him
forge deeper connections with the Nine Inch Nails faithful.").
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functions. To reduce the costs of delivering free digital music to fans,
Reznor makes downloads available through BitTorrent, a web applica-
tion regarded by many other musicians as "the domain of pirates."33
The independent musicians Kristen Hersh (of Throwing Muses) and
Donita Sparks (of L7) launched an online project called CASH Music
(Coalition for Artists and Stakeholders) in 2008. The CASH site ini-
tially offered only Hersh's music for download," but many other
musicians are now involved.16 The site makes music downloads available
in several DRM-free formats, and permits downloaders to pay whatever
they want for music (set at a $3 default price and presented on the CASH
site as an optional "one-time contribution"), album artwork, and liner
notes, or in the alternative, to download for free. Hersh has also made
the original sound files for each song available to enable more techni-
cally adept fans to produce remixed versions of her songs.3 ' The music
on Hersh's CASH site is offered to fans under a Creative Commons li-
cense permitting fans to copy, distribute, and alter the works, as long as
they provide attribution and refrain from using the work for a commer-
cial purpose.3 9
Singer-songwriter Jill Sobule, a former major label recording artist,
raised over $75,000 through online contributions on her website to fi-
nance a new album in fifty-three days, surpassing her initial goal.4
Sobule handed responsibility for the basic pitch to her mother, display-
ing this message on the website created for the fundraising drive:
Hi, I'm Elaine, Jill's mother. As you all know, my daughter is a
real talent. She has put out 6 great CDs (which never leave my
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Antony Bruno, New Web Site Encourages Fan Remixes and Interaction, REUTERS
(Dec. 9, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/musicNews/idUSNO9337385
2 0071209.
35. Id.
36. See CASH Music, http://www.cashmusic.org/more (last visited Sept. 21, 2010)
("CASH Music is a . . . nonprofit organization building open-source tools and services to
benefit artists and music organizations. It's our belief that the need for technology should
never get in the way of promotion, distribution, or support of great music.").
37. See, e.g., Series 1, CASH Music, http://kristinhersh.cashmusic.org/seriesl/ (last
visited Nov. 22, 2010).
38. E.g., id. (click on an individual track on the right to see a download link for the mix
stems).
39. Id.
40. See Questions & Answers, JILL'S NEXT RECORD, http://www.jillsnextrecord.com/
faq.asp (last visited Sept. 21, 2010) ("Think of it as a kind of a web-based telethon, or the
pledge drive for your favorite public TV or radio station. We're taking donations here (using
PayPal for online payment processing) and, just like with a telethon, you can watch the tote
board and see how we're doing.").
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stereo), and has been on 4 labels-two of which went bankrupt;
the other two were also farkakte.
This time she wants to do it on her own. She has some wonder-
ful new songs (although she has not sent them to me, like I
asked). She also has lined up some wonderful musicians and
guest artists.
So help and be a part of her new album, in exchange for some
41wonderful gifts and services.
Five hundred fifty-six people contributed to the fundraising drive,
with most paying between $10 and $100 (one fan paid $10,000) before
Sobule closed the site to donations.42 At each level of contribution,
Sobule offered informal rewards connected to the production of the al-
bum (for example, free digital downloads before the official release, free
admission to Sobule's shows in 2008).4 One critic referred to the album
(entitled California Years) as one of the first releases to be funded en-
tirely by "fan anticipation.""
All of the models discussed above emerged in the last three years
alone. But despite broad experimentation, there is still no consensus on
cooperative models' potential as a mode of artist compensation. Indeed,
the criteria for deeming a cooperative model "successful" remain elu-
sive. The cooperative experiments we describe here, generally speaking,
have exhibited high levels of free riding. Is that a signal that permissive
downloading norms are so firmly rooted that voluntary compensation
models will inevitably fall short, or is the overall percentage of people
who download for free a misleading statistic? Discussion of cooperative
models tends to assume that voluntary payment must replace the tradi-
tional industry model in order to be deemed significant. The traditional
model, however (as we discuss in greater detail below), is not a particu-
larly efficient mechanism for delivering revenue to artists.
Finally, the basic mechanics of cooperative models have received too
little attention; that is, we don't know much about how they work. The
41. A Message from Jill, JILL'S NEXT RECORD, http://www.jillsnextrecord.com/Prev-
msg.asp (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
42. Sobule cut off contributions after exceeding her goal of $75,000-the amount she
estimated would be necessary to produce the new record. See Tote Board, JILL'S NEXT RE-
CORD, http://www.jillsnextrecord.com/toteboard.asp (last visited Sept. I1, 2010). Sobule treats
fan donations as contributions, not as investments with an associated right to return on capital.
Questions & Answers, supra note 40.
43. The website that Sobule created for the fundraising drive displayed an ongoing tally
of contributions, broken down by amount contributed and also by state and country. See Tote
Board, supra note 42.
44. Ben Greenman, Price Point, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 13, 2009, at 14.
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models discussed above, and the models that we examine in depth in this
Article, rely on different design strategies. No attempt has yet been made
to identify best practices and examples of systemic failure in the devel-
opment of voluntary payment models. As a result, we have only a crude
picture of why such models succeed and why they fail.
II. MUSIC INDUSTRY BASELINES
The landscape is changing quickly, but at least this much is clear:
revenues from retail sales of recorded works represent a small percent-
age of overall income for most musicians. 45 As a result, relatively
small-scale cooperative models can-from the perspective of individ-
ual musicians-amount to a major improvement over existing options.
In order to see why this is so, one must understand how standard re-
cord label-artist recording contracts work. As of 2005, four major record
labels controlled almost 72% of the market for recorded works.46 In a
standard major label contract, an artist ordinarily receives a royalty be-
tween 9-12% on every (physical) album sold.47 The Future of Music
Coalition, a non-profit organization devoted to bettering economic con-
ditions for musicians, estimates that the actual royalty is usually more
like 6%, as labels generally take "standard industry deductions" (for ex-
ample, warehousing fees, deduction for promotional free copies) that
reduce the artist's share of each album sold. 48 Factoring in such deduc-
tions, the authors of This Business of Music, a popular industry guide
now in its tenth edition, estimate that an artist receiving a 12% base roy-
45. See John Seabrook, The Price of the Ticket, THE NEW YORKER, Aug. 10, 2009, at
34.
46. See IFPI Releases Definitive Statistics on Global Market for Recorded Music, IFPI
(Aug. 2, 2005), http://www.ifpi.org/content/section-news/20050802.html. A slew of "inde-
pendent" labels control the remainder of the market. Id. See generally INT'L FED'N OF THE
PHONOGRAPHIC INDUs., DIGITAL MUSIC REPORT 2009, [hereinafter DIGITAL Music REPORT]
available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/dmr2009.pdf (describing the market structure
of the recording industry).
47. The royalty figure is complicated by the existence of two distinct intellectual prop-
erty rights residing in the recorded work-the copyright in the sound recording, and the
copyright in the underlying piece of music. Terry Fisher estimates that composer and per-
former royalties amount to 4% and 12%, respectively, of an album's retail price. Thus, when a
recording artist is also a work's composer, the expected royalty percentage will be higher. See
WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF EN-
TERTAINMENT 262 (2004).
48. Major Label Contract Clause Critique, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION (Oct. 3,
2001), http://futureofmusic.org/article/article/major-label-contract-clause-critique.
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alty ultimately receives approximately $0.55 for every $15.00 album
sold (12% of $15.00 is $1.80).49
Before an artist begins receiving royalties, album sales must surpass
a "break even" point defined by the up-front investment that the label
puts into the album's production, distribution, and promotion.so These
costs vary dramatically. A self-produced artist working with her own
equipment can produce an album for as little as a few thousand dollars."
In a typical major label release, recording costs alone typically run from
$80,000-150,000.2
Of the approximately 32,000 albums released in the United States
each year, less than 10% sell enough to allow the label to recoup its up-
front costs.53 Fewer than 250 of those 32,000 albums sell more than
10,000 copies, and fewer than 30 go platinum (i.e., sell more than I mil-
14lion copies). Thus, the overwhelming majority of album releases net no
revenue for the individual artist, and it is common for artists to wind up
owing money to the record label for un-recouped recording and promo-
tion costs."
The market for recorded music is increasingly going digital amidst a
steady decline in physical CD sales, but unfavorable contract terms for
artists persist. In 2008, record companies brought in $3.7 billion globally
from digital music sales, 20% of the overall market for recorded music
(up from 5% of global revenue in 2005, and 15% in 2007). The major-
ity of digital revenues came from individual song downloads through
platforms such as Apple's iTunes online music store. Artists, however,
typically receive only a royalty between 8-14% on each download, with
iTunes retaining a 35% cut and the remainder going to the record label."
49. M. WILLIAM KRASILOVSKY & SIDNEY SHEMEL, THIS BUSINESS OF Music 21 (10th
ed. 2007).
50. Id. at 22-23.
51. See DAVID KUSEK & GERD LEONHARD, THE FUTURE OF MUSIC: MANIFESTO FOR
THE DIGITAL Music REVOLUTION 143 (2005).
52. KRASILOVSKY & SHEMEL, supra note 49, at 22.
53. KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 51, at 108.
54. Id.
55. Record labels generally treat an up-front advance as a non-recourse loan to the
artist, and recoup their costs out of the artist's share of future royalties. Because the loan is
treated as non-recourse, the advance functions as the only tangible income most recording
artists receive-and the amount of any advance varies according to a recording artist's relative
bargaining power. See MOSES AVALON, SECRETS OF NEGOTIATING A RECORDING CONTRACT
11-12 (2001). As fewer than 10% of artists sell enough records to cover the advance, most
artists never see any royalties, and indeed, at least in theory, owe money to the label. See
KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 51, at 108.
56. See DIGITAL Music REPORT, supra note 46, at 6-7.
57. See id. at 6, 10.
58. See iTunes iSbogus, DOWNHILL BATTLE, http://www.downhillbattle.org/itunes/
(last visited Sept. 12, 2010).
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Further, the persistence of illicit peer-to-peer ("P2P") file-sharing pre-
sents a serious challenge for artists who seek to convert downloads into
revenue. A major music industry trade group estimates that for every
legal song downloaded (through online stores like iTunes), nearly twenty
copies are downloaded over the file-sharing networks. 9
For artists seeking a route around record labels and the accompany-
ing unfavorable contract terms, alternative pathways have emerged.
From the standpoint of artist compensation, the online music store CD
Baby is perhaps the most successful new model.m CD Baby distributes
the work of independent artists (i.e., those that are not affiliated with a
record label), and serves as both a download platform and a distributor
of physical CDs.6' In contrast to the traditional model, CD Baby strives
to minimize overhead costs: approximately 90% of revenues generated
through the site is paid directly to the artists.62
Since its founding ten years ago, more than 228,000 artists have dis-
tributed their music through CD Baby, and over 4.2 million albums have
been sold through the site, generating over $97 million in revenue dis-
tributed directly to artists. In 2008, the site's most successful sales year
to date (based on available information), CD Baby paid out more than
$34 million in revenue to artists.64
While the aggregate sales numbers are impressive-especially con-
sidering the industry-wide decline in CD sales-the average artist selling
music through CD Baby received a payment of just $228 in 2008.65 Four
thousand artists received between $1000 and $10,000 in payments from
CD Baby, and roughly 200 (out of more than 150,000 artists selling mu-
sic on the site) earned more than $10,000.66
Of course, record sales amount to just one potential revenue stream
for musicians-others include payment for live performances, merchan-
dise sales, and work-for-hire composing gigs. Despite the myriad ways
that musicians manage to make a living, and the ubiquity of music in
most of our lives, their aggregate income tends to be quite modest. In
59. See DIGITAL Music REPORT, supra note 46, at 22 ("IFPI, collating separate studies
in 16 countries over a four-year period, estimated unauthorised file-sharing at over 40 billion
files in 2008. This means that globally around 95 per cent of music tracks are downloaded
without payment to the artist or the music company that produced them.").
60. See generally CD BABY, http://www.cdbaby.com/ (last visited Sept. 12, 2010)
(website for world's largest online distributor of independent (i.e., not distributed by an estab-
lished record label) music).
61. About Us, CD BABY, http://www.cdbaby.com/About (last visited Nov. 21, 2010).
62. Tony van Veen, CD Baby 2008 Stats for CD and Download Sales, CD BABY BLOG
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2005, the 273,000 working musicians in the United States earned an av-
erage annual income of around $30,000.' Taking into account the low
percentage of recorded works that sell enough copies to justify their up-
front costs, it is clear that existing models do not permit the vast majority
of musicians to depend on the sale of recorded works to satisfy their ba-
sic material needs.
In sum, existing pathways for the sale and distribution of music
make it very difficult for musicians to profit from their recorded works.
The persistence of illicit file-sharing and the rise of legal download plat-
forms that hold a large share of overall revenue combine to squeeze
digital sales as a mode of artist compensation. While online distribution
carries the promise of empowering musicians and providing them with a
more reliable stream of income, that potential remains for the most part
untapped.
III. RESULTS FROM THE THREE STUDY SITES
The three study sites at the center of this paper employ cooperative
models similar, at a general level, to the distribution experiments sum-
marized above. On closer inspection, however, their different approaches
to fostering cooperation are significant and instructive. Our research
team followed each of the study sites for over a year, retaining complete
access to sales databases and web activity data.
Let us first clarify the ways in which the study sites rely on social
cooperation. First, the artists that distribute their music through the study
sites are sufficiently popular that their music could be found either
through P2P networks or by identifying and trading with users who have
already purchased songs. Because much of the music is licensed under
Creative Commons licenses, doing so would be perfectly legal. Thus, to
the extent that users are coming to the three study sites and paying to
download music, they are choosing to pay and taking the time to do so,
even though there are alternative avenues through which they could le-
gally acquire the music for free.
Next, each of the sites involve some form of voluntary or flexible
payment-specifically, payment that users need not make if their only
goal is to access music for the lowest possible price. Users who do con-
tribute "extra" money are thus voluntarily contributing to the artists'
67. KUSEK & LEONHARD, supra note 51, at 108.
68. At least in the case of Coulton, who also makes his music available on iTunes, fans
who come to pay on the site may benefit the artist by cutting out iTunes. However, doing so
imposes higher transactions costs on the downloader-iTunes is popular, convenient, and easy
to use.
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well-being, and are demonstrating generosity in the dyadic relationship
of fan to artist. They are also supporting the continued creation of mu-
sic-a public good.
Finally, Jonathan Coulton's music distribution model relies on coop-
eration in that he specifically enlists fans to help with promotion, concert
planning, and creation of new mashups, without compensating them.
Users who respond to these solicitations are cooperating with Coulton by
contributing time and effort.
With the exception of Coulton, the artists associated with the study
sites generally make modest amounts from download sales. The amounts
are, nonetheless, substantial by comparison to what artists can expect to
make from royalties under the traditional approach (and newer alterna-
tive approaches). On Magnatune, top-selling artists can earn from
$8000-10,000 per year. 9 Jane Siberry's online store yielded more than
$33,000 over the three years between the site's launch in March 2005
and the conclusion of our study. Considering that the vast majority of
artists net little or no income from the sale of their recorded works,70
these numbers reflect substantial fan contributions. Jonathan Coulton
earns about $90,000 per year from digital downloads on his personal
site. To achieve a similar level of compensation through more traditional
channels, Coulton would need to sell about 650,000 full albums per year
through iTunes, and much more under the more artist-unfriendly terms
contained within a standard record industry contract.
A. Jane Siberry's Online Music Store
Canadian singer-songwriter Jane Siberry" launched an experiment in
consumer-determined pricing in March 2005.72 She made digital
69. Data on the study sites are on file with the authors. Magnatune's contracts
with artists are non-exclusive. Distribution Contract Terms, MAGNATUNE, http://
www.magnatune.com/info/terms (last visited Oct. 9, 2010). Magnatune revenues are often
only a portion of a given artist's revenues from recorded works. What We Do for Our Musi-
cians, MAGNATUNE, http://www.magnatune.com/info/whatwedo (last visited Oct. 9, 2010).
70. See discussion supra Part II.
71. Jane Siberry released several albums on major record labels through the 1980s and
early 1990s, and enjoyed considerable commercial and critical success. See Jane Siberry
Biography, ARTISTDIRECT, http://www.artistdirect.com/artist/bio/jane-siberry/492899 (last
visited Oct. 8, 2010). She is perhaps best known for her song "Calling All Angels," released
as a duet with k.d. lang on her 1993 album When I Was a Boy. Id. In 1995, Siberry created her
own independent label, SHEEBA Records, and has since released all of her new material on
that imprint. Id.; see also Jane Siberry Opens a Window on a Better Download World, ELEC-
TRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 27, 2005), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2005/1 I/jane-
siberry-opens-window-better-download- world [hereinafter Jane Siberry Opens a Window]
(reporting on Siberry's then newly unveiled download store, where all of her songs were
available as plain MP3s).
72. See Jane Siberry Opens a Window, supra note 71.
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download versions of recorded music from over fifteen albums available
for free through a self-designed, owned, and operated online store.
Siberry's store permits fans to set their own price for music, or to pay
nothing at all.74 The downloads are not encumbered with restrictive code,
and come in a high-fidelity MP3 format. Siberry also makes sheet
music, videos, and album artwork available, all on a voluntary payment
model .
After electing to download an individual song on Siberry's site, a
consumer selects from four options in a drop-down menu: (1) "a gift
from the artist" (no payment); (2) "standard price" ($0.99); (3) "self-
determined, pay now"; and (4) "self-determined, pay later."77 Those who
choose the "standard price" are directed to provide credit card informa-
tion, and those who choose the "self-determined" options are allowed to
enter whatever price they like before providing payment.7 ' The site in-
forms downloaders that choosing a price of less than $0.45 actually costs
the site money, as it does not cover the transactional fee (it also informs
visitors that free downloads bypass all transaction costs).79 Siberry also
makes entire albums available for sale, and the "standard price" varies
depending on the number of tracks on the album (i.e., a four-song EP is
priced at $3.33, and a full-length album at $9.99)."0 Potential customers
can also elect to stream all of the music on the site before downloading,
enabling them to preview a song before selecting a purchase option."
The site presents visitors with a mission statement explaining the de-
sign principles, spirit, and reasoning behind Siberry's pricing policy. It
reads:
This store model is based on the belief that: People are good. In
trust, our best comes forward full force. To treat others as we
would like to be treated is generous, not selfish. Good living can
73. Id. Siberry recently overhauled her website, altering or removing some of the fea-
tures discussed herein. For her current website, see Music, JANE SIBERRY, http://
www.janesiberry.com/janesiberry/music.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2010). Sources for the
website's prior features are on file with the authors. Some of these features and language from
the original website are available at Frequently Asked Questions, SHEEBA MUSIC CATALOGUE,
http://www.jemmoore.com/store/help.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). Citations to this web-
site are provided where consistent with Siberry's original website.
74. Jane Siberry Opens a Window, supra note 71.
75. Id.
76. See Music, supra note 73.
77. Jane Siberry Opens a Window, supra note 71. Siberry removed the "pay later"
option in March 2008. See Music, supra note 73.
78. See Jane Siberry Opens a Window, supra note 71.
79. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 73.
80. Data on file with authors.
81. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 73.
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still come from not trying to control things; in trusting in a wider
sense of transactions. We are 'a part' more than 'apart'.
Things to ponder. Not too long, though. Life is out there waiting.
The most important thing is that the music flow out to where it
could bring enjoyment. And THAT is the best thing you could
give back to me.
The site also hosts an open-thread "feedback" page where fans can
express their views on the pricing policy and explain the reasons for their
payment decisions."' In March 2008, Siberry added a page entitled "crea-
tive currencies," on which downloaders can commit to performing
positive deeds in exchange for music downloads ("creative currency" is
also now one of the options a downloader can choose from in electing
their preferred mode of payment).
Siberry displays summary statistics on the online store's home page,
reporting the percentage of downloaders that pay for an individual song,
and the average price per song. The summary statistics are incomplete.
They do not include, for example, information about album sales, and
the averages are not weighted to include those that download for free.
Even so, the summary statistics provide visitors to the site with a basic
sense of how others are behaving.
We have analyzed sales data from Siberry's site spanning from its
launch in March 2005 through January 2009. Over that time, 52,661
people downloaded content from the store, earning Siberry approxi-
mately $33,000 in revenue. Twenty-two percent of the transactions
conducted on the site involved a voluntary payment. In the remaining
transactions, the downloader selected the "gift from the artist" option, or
chose the "pay later" option and never returned to make a contribution.
Period of Record







85. See Id. (listing statistics for February 3, 2005 through January 23, 2008).
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Radiohead Release New Album
'Pay Later'
Shaded bars denote the month of December. The black line shows mean monthly reve-
nue, and the shaded region (dotted line) encompasses the 25th (5th) and 75th (95th)
percentiles.
The average price per song, among those who paid, was $1.25, and
the average price per album was $9.00. The term "corrected average"
refers to the average price among those who paid some amount for an
album or song. The "nulls" represent transactions where, due to record-
keeping idiosyncrasies, Siberry's sales database does not note whether a
given downloader chose the standard price, self-determined price, or
some other option, but does record the amount paid (if any).
86. Siberry began keeping track of web statistics in late 2006, and we are unable to


























Three notable trends emerge upon close review of the sales data.
First, voluntary contribution on Siberry's site is persistent and relatively
stable over a significant period of time. The declining number of transac-
tions reflects the natural drop-off in interest as the period since the
release of the last new album increases. We see transactions picking up
again in early 2009, when Siberry released a new album. Second, norm-
driven behavior appears to account for the bulk of voluntary contribu-
tions. Third, Siberry derives a great deal of her revenue from the
downloaders who exhibit an unusual level of generosity-what we deem
"asymmetric" contributors.
Although a sizeable majority of downloaders elect to pay nothing,
the combination of norm-driven behavior and unusual altruism led to an
average price per song download that is higher than the average price in
the standard forced payment (i.e., iTunes or Amazon.com) model. If we
do not include those who download for free in the calculation of the av-
erage, contributors pay about 25% more than in the $0.99 per song
forced payment models.
If one compares the average including the nonpaying fans, however,
then the relevant comparison to the forced payment system should in-
clude the nonpaying illegal downloaders. A major music industry trade
group, in its 2009 annual report on the state of the global music market,
found that for every legal digital MP3 sale, twenty digital files are
downloaded illegally over the file-sharing networks." On Siberry's site,
87. See DIGITAL Music REPORT, supra note 46, at 22.
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the ratio is much more favorable to the artist (five free downloads for
every paid download)." If the music industry's estimation of illegal file-
sharing volume is correct, then the average payment per track in that sys-
tem is about $0.05, as compared to Siberry's $0.28 (uncorrected).






1. Stable Cooperative System
All content on Siberry's site is entirely free. One need not enter a
credit card number or provide contact information to access digital
88. Although it is of course possible that some people download Siberry's music over
P2P file-sharing networks, we assume the volume of such downloads to be negligible given
that downloaders can access free copies of Siberry's work through her website without incur-
ring any legal risk. Choosing to download Siberry's work over P2P networks therefore
amounts to a voluntarily choice to absorb an additional cost (i.e., the risk of incurring copy-
right liability, or receiving a corrupt or low quality file). Obtaining free downloads from
Siberry's website does not require the downloader to enter an email address or any other per-
sonal information.
89. The "overhead" figure in the Voluntary Payment figure is a rough estimate of web
maintenance and other related costs that artists like Siberry must cover.
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downloads. Over the course of three and a half years, approximately
22% of the people that came to the site to download music chose to pay
for it, and on average, they paid more than the standard iTunes baseline-
market price. Although the size of the average payment fluctuated
somewhat, responding to internal events (for example, the launch of the
site, Siberry's release of a new album) and external events (media cover-
age of Siberry's site connected with the Radiohead In Rainbows release),
the percentage of people choosing to voluntarily pay for music stabilized
around 22% and persisted at that level over the length of the study pe-
riod.
The standard rational actor model, of course, predicts that anyone
who wants to download Siberry's music will choose the "gift" option.
Doing so incurs no material costs, there is no threat of a lawsuit, and
paying for music does not allow a downloader to obtain a higher quality
file or any additional material benefit. In a slightly more expansive view
of rational self-interest, contribution would have to be explained with a
"warm glow" or a self-signaling model, since the transactions are opaque
to others and so cannot provide a social-signaling or reputation func-
tion.9
FIGURE 2
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Radiohead Release New Album
'Pay Later*
Average Individual MP3 Price (excluding free downloads)
90. See Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, Incentives and Prosocial Behavior, 96 AM.
EcON. REV. 1652, 1657-58 (2006).
91. Over the first few months of 2005, Siberry did not record how many people
downloaded for free, which accounts for the inflated average at the beginning of the graph.
The following two figures show average song and album price, excluding free downloads.
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2. Norm-Driven Cooperators, Focal Points,
and Asymmetric Contribution
A relatively small group of moderate contributors are responsible for
about 70% of Siberry's overall revenue, and a tiny group of hyper-
generous altruists account for a non-trivial portion.' The tables below
reflect the percentage of revenue, and the overall frequency of "normal"












































































Close to 7,000 contributors paid the "industry standard" payment of
about $1, and another 700 paid twice that amount, together accounting
for 69% of the revenue from singles. Three hundred eighty downloaders
paid $3 or more for an individual MP3 (just under 1% of all MP3
93. Data on file with authors.
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downloaders), but these hyper-generous contributors accounted for 28%
of the total revenue from MP3 sales. Similarly, about 1400 downloaders
contributed around the less well-defined "industry standard" (as we will
see from Magnatune, this number is typical) of $10 or $12 per album,
accounting for 75% of the revenue from albums. One hundred thirty-four
downloaders paid $18 or more for a full album (1.5% of all album
downloaders), accounting for 12% of the total revenue from album sales.
This pattern of contribution is consistent with at least three or four
distinct motivational profiles. First, around 78% (+/-1%) of downloaders
pay nothing. Given the persistent and pervasive nature of this public
good problem, it is impossible, to separate the self-interested actors from
the conditional cooperators in this group.M It is well understood theoreti-
cally, and well-established experimentally, that in a repeated public
goods game, where cooperators have no means of policing defectors or
reciprocating their defection, conditional cooperators "reciprocate" or
"punish" the defectors by withholding their own contributions." The
surprising result is that, despite the absence of any means of punishment
or reputation, a stable portion continues to contribute. Based on the
amount contributed, this portion seems to fall into two categories. The
bulk of the remaining participants contribute a "normal" amount, where
"normal" is defined either from the internal promptings of the site itself
(as we will see in the study of Magnatune), or derived from baseline cul-
tural understandings of whatever behavior counts as appropriate for that
setting. "Normal" can reflect moral commitment," whether enforced
emotionally, cognitively, or some combination of the two;97 social con-
formism;9' or a norm-defined level of "fair" or "equitable" payment,
which in turn is enforced by the kind of inequity aversion that has been
94. The prevailing experimental finding is that in unmodified public goods games, a
substantial number of players initially cooperate, but gradually reduce cooperation over the
life of the experiment once they see that other players are free riding. See Ernst Fehr & Simon
Gichter, Altruistic Punishment in Humans, 415 NATURE 137, 137-39 (2002). In the field
setting we studied, an observation of a high level of non-contribution almost certainly corre-
sponds to later stages of the experimental model, where both self-interested players and
conditional cooperators no longer contribute to the common pool.
95. See id.
96. See Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of
Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & Pun. AFF. 317 (1977).
97. The long debate over the source of moral commitments, whether based in moral
emotions or sentiments, as Hume and Smith posited, or in rational commitment, as Kant
would have it, continues in cognitive psychology today. See MARC HAUSER, MORAL MINDS
20-26, 31, 36 (2006); Joshua D. Green, The Secret Joke of Kant's Soul, in 3 MORAL PsY-
CHOLOGY 35, 41 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2006).
98. See ROBERT BOYD & PETER J. RICHERSON, CULTURE AND THE EVOLUTIONARY
PROCESS 205-212 (1985); Joe Henrich & Robert Boyd, The Evolution of Conformist Trans-
mission and the Emergence of Between-Group Diferences, 19 EVOLUTION & Hum. BEHAV.
215, 215-41 (1998).
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shown to exist experimentally in many studies." It is difficult to tell
which of these mechanisms is at play here, because Siberry uses both
appeals to "the market price," which would evoke the focal point of
$0.99 from iTunes and Amazon.com, and also speaks of fairness, trust,
and generosity, thus evoking several mechanisms.
What is interesting about these actors is that they seem to be distinct
from the conditional cooperators, who are predicted and observed to re-
ciprocate the behavior of large numbers of noncontributors by
withholding their own contributions. Rather, this appears to be an in-
stance of norm-driven behavior that successfully overcomes, for some
actors, the inter-contributor negative reciprocity usually thought to lead
to the unraveling of cooperation in public goods games without punish-
ment. Finally, there is the group of hyper-generous altruists who pay
well above anything that could be considered norm-compliant. These
findings support the ideas that: (a) there are different "types" of agents,
who respond differently to different types of motivations; and (b) not all
forms of prosociality are the same, and not all are triggered by the same
mechanisms or susceptible to the same failures. Even in a repeated pub-
lic goods game, as here, there remains a substantial minority of
contributors consisting of what appear to be norm-driven contributors
and altruists.
For purposes of design, these findings suggest that a site needs both
normative triggers and affordances for asymmetric contribution, in order
to capture contributions from this diverse range of motivational types.
B. Magnatune-Internet Label with Flexible Pricing Scheme
In May 2003, after watching his wife and friends endure the tribula-
tions of releasing their CDs through a classic record label, John
Buckman founded Magnatune. " Unlike Siberry's site, which houses a
few artists, Buckman envisioned Magnatune as a music label that would
embrace "Internet Reality."'O' It would allow file-sharing,"'0 share profits
fairly,'o3 and reject the strict $0.99 per song industry default price. In-
stead, Magnatune uses a flexible payment scale for online music sales in
99. See Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity: Evi-
dence and Economic Applications, in I ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS 208,
211-218 (Mathias Dewatripont et al. eds., 2003).
100. John Buckman, Founder's Rant, MAGNATUNE, http://www.magnatune.com/info/
why (last visited Oct. 8, 2010); see also Interview with John Buckman, RED HAT MAG. (Apr.
2005), http://www.redhat.com/magazine/006apfO5/features/buckman/.
101. Buckman, Founder's Rant, supra note 100.
102. Give 3 Free Copies to Your Friends, MAGNATUNE, http://www.magnatune.com/
info/give (last visited Oct. 8,2010).
103. See Why We Are Not Evil, MAGNATUNE, http://www.magnatune.com/info/
whynotevil (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
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which the price paid for music is set by the buyer." Commenting on the
sliding scale, a USA Today reporter said, "The Internet makes dynamic
pricing possible-prices that change depending on demand. EBay's auc-
tions are one way to do it. Magnatune is trying something a little
different-and it includes playing on a buyer's conscience."Os
The model relies on two basic assumptions: first, customers will pay
more than the required minimum when they feel they are being treated
fairly by a record label and know that a label's artists are treated fairly as
well; and second, customers will pay more when they are permitted to
stream full versions of albums before deciding whether to purchase
them.
Magnatune currently maintains a catalogue of over 700 albums", in
a diverse range of genres (including classical),'07 and offers the artists'
works as digital album downloads and as part of a commercial licensing
package.'" All revenues are split evenly with the artists.'" The label
maintains a strict selection process, accepting submissions from only
three percent of artists, and only those who fit the label's creative pro-
file."0
Magnatune's sliding scale model offers multiple ways for visitors to
consume albums for free. Site visitors can stream the label's entire cata-
logue without making a purchase or click "license" and download
albums under a Creative Commons license."' The choice to make the
downloads accessible only after a user clicks "license," rather than pre-
senting the "free" or "gift" options like Siberry or Coulton, is a pointed
one. As Buckman explains:
The reason for this seemingly arcane process is to divide users
between those looking for 'free as in beer' from those looking
for 'free as in freedom'. The 'free as in beer' people would be
unlikely to think to click on the 'license' button, looking instead
for a download button. The 'free as in freedom' people (i.e.,
104. Magnatune has recently shifted to a membership model. See Magnatune Re-
launches as Membership Site, MAGNATUNE, http://www.magnatune.com/info/news/emaill
albums-2010-03-25.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2010). The following discussion describes the
prior "sliding scale" model.
105. Kevin Maney, Apple iTunes Might Not Be Only Answer to Ending Piracy, USA
TODAY, Jan. 4, 2004, at 3B.
106. Magnatune Statistics, MAGNATUNE, http://www.magnatune.com/info/stats/ (last
visited Oct. 8, 2010).
107. MP3 Music Genres, MAGNATUNE, http://www.magnatune.com/genres/ (last visited
Oct. 8, 2010).
108. Music Licensing at Magnatune, MAGNATUNE, http://www.magnatune.com/info/
liccnsing (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
109. Why We Are Not Evil, supra note 103.
110. Id.
ill. Interview with John Buckman, supra note 100.
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creators who want to make a new work) are more likely to want
to see what the license cost and terms are. The goal of this ap-
proach is to offer the CC licensed downloads for free to creative
people, while the consuming public pays for downloads.""2
In addition to the voluntary payment system and the framing of the
free download option, Magnatune is also unique in that users control
how much they pay for albums and subscriptions."' The label charges
between $5 and $18 per album, and recommends that purchasers pay $8.
Purchasers choose a price from a drop-down menu that says "How much
do you want to pay? $8 (typical), $10 (better than average), $12 (gener-
ous), $15 (VERY generous), $18 (We love you!)."ll 4 These prompts
create normative focal points for differently motivated users-ranging
from those who want to pay the minimum, to those who want to conform
to a behavioral norm, to those who want to signal that they are better
than average or even hyper-generous.
The transaction can be completed by credit card or PayPal, and pur-
chasers are free to leave their email addresses so that they can be
contacted by artists."' In addition, until recently, physical CDs could also
be purchased for an additional $4.97, covering the costs of materials and
shipping."6
Magnatune added a subscription component in May 2008, and tink-
ered with the component's design during the study period.' '7 Initially,
purchasers were allowed to buy streaming or download memberships at
112. E-mail from John Buckman, Founder and Owner, Magnatune, to authors (Feb. 4,
2010, 2:09 PM EST) (on file with authors).
113. Interview with John Buckman, supra note 100. To understand the business models
of open sharing of music, it is worth noting that Magnatune also offers efficient commercial
licensing features. In addition to downloading and purchasing albums for individual use, con-
sumers can commercially license music for use in films, ringtones, podcasts, and other media.
Commercial licensing represents the site's largest source of revenue and continues to grow.
Unlike the industry standard where licensees often have to show music owners the final work
or pay copyright owners perpetual royalties, Magnatune uses a fast, computerized process.
Licensees provide details on how the music will be used and the predicted scope of distribu-
tion, and Magnatune, trusting the honesty of users, charges a flat fee. These attributes of the
site, while interesting, do not go to the question of voluntary donation that is the core concern
of our study. See The Business Model, MAGNATUNE, http://www.magnatune.com/info/model
(last visited Sept. 11, 2010).
114. See infra Figure 8.
115. FAQ: Download Membership, MAGNATUNE, http://www.magnatune.com/info/
faq-download (last visited Nov. 18, 2010); What's In It for Musicians, MAGNATUNE,
http://www.magnatune.com/info/musicians (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
116. See FAQ: Download Membership, supra note 115.
117. See John Buckman, Magnatune Memberships: The Only "All You Can Eat" DRM-
Free Music Subscription Service, BUCKMAN'S MAGNATUNE BLOG (May 7, 2008, 11:09 AM),
http://blogs.magnatune.com/buckman/2008/05/magnatune-membe.html.
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three month, one year, or lifetime intervals (Period 1)."' Four months
later, Magnatune added a flexible payment model to the subscriptions
option, allowing customers to select their own price for a subscription by
filling in a box and replacing a default price with the new number (Pe-
riod 2)."9 Finally, in November of 2008, Buckman added a one month
option to the subscription offerings, lowering the minimum commitment
required (Period 3).'2
We analyzed consumer sales data for Magnatune's site spanning
over five years from May 2003 to November 2008.121 Over that time,
75,186 transactions were completed, generating $671,770 in revenue.
This sum does not include commercial licensing revenues.
FIGURE 5
Total
Period of Record Total Transactions Revenue
Albums 5/13/2003-12/11/2008 73589 $600,750
Subscriptions 4/30/2008-11/20/2008 1597 $71,020
TABLE I
Mean Median Mode
Total 8.16 8.00 8.00
Period 1 8.06 8.00 8.00
Period 2 8.32 800 8.00
Period 3 8.24 8.00 8.00
Average price per album during three time periods. The difference in
mean prices between Period I and Periods 2 and 3 is significant at
p > .05. There is no statistically significant difference between the mean
album price during Periods 2 and 3.
118. Id.
119. John Buckman, Pay-What You Want Memberships, BUCKMAN'S MAGNATUNE BLOG
(Sept. 27, 2008, 4:13 AM), http://blogs.magnatune.com/buckman/2008/09/pay-what-you-
wa.html.
120. John Buckman, Membership Without Obligation, BUCKMAN'S MAGNATUNE BLOG,
(Nov. 18, 2008, 4:31 AM), http://blogs.magnatune.com/buckman/2008/1 I/membership-
with.html.
121. Data on file with the authors.
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The median price paid for albums was $8.00. The mean price paid
for albums was $8.06 and increased to $8.32 after introduction of the
subscription option.
FIGURE 6
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Average weekly album price throughout the course of the record. The gray box spans the
25th and 75th percentiles.
Four major trends can be seen in the Magnatune sales database.
First, the sales data indicates that Magnatune is a stable cooperative sys-
tem in which purchasers regularly pay more for albums than is required.
Second, purchasers are influenced by words of encouragement that cre-
ate very clear focal points around which fans coordinate their
purchasing. Third, like Siberry's fans, fans on Magnatune show both
significant norm-conformism and include a small number of hypergen-
erous altruists with a significant effect on total contributions. About 50%
of the contributors aim to pay the "typical" amount, and another 12%
"above average." These categories of users account for about 60% of the
site's revenues. Another 7.5% of users pay hypergenerous amounts. The
result is that Magnatune earns about 15% of its revenues from the
roughly 9% of purchasers who seem to respond to generosity-signaling,
as opposed to typicality or average-signaling, focal points. Unlike Si-
berry's site, however, less than 10% of users choose to pay the
minimum. This presumably reflects the fact that those who choose to
pay nothing must do so by copying from friends, rather than having an
explicit option to download for free, as with Siberry's site. Finally, the
subscription trends suggest that over time new subscribers congregate
[Vol. 17:1
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around the least burdensome subscription option but continue to pay
more than the minimum.
1. Stable Cooperative System-Over 90% of Revenue Generated
from People Paying More than the Minimum Required
In the standard rational-actor model, one would expect fans of the
music distributed on Magnatune to pay nothing. The music is available
legally and at high technical quality, and can be redistributed at low cost
once one copy has been downloaded. Even among fans who choose to
buy the music, the standard prediction is that fans would pay the mini-
mum $5 per album required for purchase. Instead, the payment history
over five years demonstrates that Magnatune fans are consistently coop-
erating and voluntarily paying significantly more than what the site
requires. The average price paid on the site is $8, 60% more than the
minimum required $5 payment. This average payment has persisted from
the site's launch through half a decade of music industry development.
Significantly, the introduction of subscription payments on the site did
not disrupt the trend of stable voluntary payment.
FIGURE 7
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Weekly revenue. The gray box spans the 25th and 75th percentiles.
The level of generosity exhibited by Magnatune's customers is also
significant. It is not just a small crowd of people that pay more than what
is required-over 80% of purchasers do, and only 16% of albums are
purchased at the minimum price of $5. The generosity of the voluntary
contributors is also notable in that nearly 20% of purchasers paid $10 or
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more-twice the minimum payment required. As a result, over 90% of
Magnatune revenues flow from album purchases of $8 or more.
TABLE 2
Bin Frequency % Revenue Revenue %
Minimum $5.00 11720 15.93% $58,600 9.72%
$5.50 446 0.61% $2,453 0.41%
$6.00 3411 4.64% $20,466 3.4%
$6.50 28 0.04% $182 0.03%
$7.00 2053 2.79% $14,371 2.38%
$7.50 2159 2.93% $16,193 2.69%
Typical $8.00 35362 48.05% $282,896 46.93%
$8.50 250 0.34% $2,125 0.35%
$9.00 1426 1.94% $12,834 2.13%
$9.50 420 0.57% $3,990 0.66%
Better than
Average $10.00 8974 12.19% $89,740 14.89%
$10.50 216 0.29% $2,268 0.38%
$11.00 395 0.54% $4,345 0.72%
$11.50 10 0.01% $115 0.02%
Generous $12.00 3657 4.97% $43,884 7.28%
$12.50 67 0.09% $838 0.14%
$13.00 193 0.26% $2,509 0.42%
$13.50 33 0.04% $446 0.07%
$14.00 323 0.44% $4,522 0.75%
$14.50 68 0.09% $986 0.16%
Very Generous $15.00 1072 1.46% $16,080 2.67%
$15.50 9 0.01% $140 0.02%
$16.00 188 0.26% $3,008 0.50%
$16.50 91 0.12% $1,502 0.25%
$17.00 26 0.04% $442 0.07%
$17.50 81 0.11% $1,418 0.24%
We Love You $18.00 867 1.18% $15,606 2.59%
$18.50 9 0.01% $167 0.03%
Everything in Its Right Place
Bin Frequency % Revenue Revenue %
$19.00 6 0.01% $114 0.02%
$22.50 3 0.00% $68 0.01%
$24.00 18 0.02% $432 0.07%
Total album sales binned by their relative frequency and percent of total revenue.
2. Coordination Around Focal Points
and Norm-Driven Behavior
The Magnatune sales data also illustrates how descriptive signals at-
tached to specific prices can create clear focal points around which
purchasers coordinate. Although purchasers can select any dollar amount
between $5 and $18, 84% of purchasers select a dollar value that has a
corresponding label of "typical," "better than average," "generous,"
"very generous," or "we love you." Note that there is no written signal,
next to the minimum $5 payment.
FIGURE 8
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The coordination around focal points is also illustrated by the steep
drop in the percentage of purchasers making payments at rates that do
not have corresponding signals. For example, in contrast to the 2% who
paid $9 or the 1.4% who paid $11, 12% of purchasers paid $10 for their
albums. This pattern indicates the strong effect of reference-dependent
payments,"2 but unlike the standard economic models, the reference on
122. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Ref-
erence-Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. EcON. 1039, 1039-61 (1991); Botond Koszegi & Matthew
Rabin, A Model Of Reference-Dependent Preferences, 121 Q.J. ECON. 1133, 1133-65 (2006).
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which the preference is dependent is a normative one, not an alternative
price, good, or state to which the agent orients herself.
Words of encouragement communicated in descriptive signals
around the pricing seem to have a significant impact in coordinating co-
operative behavior. Designating $8.00 as "typical" seems to have pulled
48.05% of contributors to the $8.00 price, 2.93% to $7.50, and 0.34% to
$8.50, as opposed to $7.00 or to the minimum. Part of the result can be
explained by reference to the apparent allure of whole numbers, as we
see some clustering around the $6.00 price point. Nevertheless, the ma-
jor driver seems to be the normatively weighted focal points.
Magnatune does not display the price paid by any individual cus-
tomers or confer any observable status upon contributors. Instead, the
written signals seem to trigger two discrete norms: first, a norm of con-
forming to the behavior of others, evoked by "typical," and perhaps even
by "better than average"; second, the norm of generosity. Given the ab-
sence of any social signal within this system, the behavior is likely most
consistent with a self-signaling, warm glow, or norm compliance model
of motivation. They allow purchasers to construct an identity as someone
who is "typical," "better than average," or "generous."
3. Asymmetrical Payments
Magnatune purchasers exhibit significant asymmetry in price selec-
tion. In contrast to Siberry's model, where 28% of revenue is generated
through purchases of $3 or more per song, only 11% of revenue is gen-
erated from purchasers that pay $12 or more per album. Site design
could account for the difference. Unlike Siberry's pricing scheme, Mag-
natune caps its payment scale at $18, and does not provide purchasers
with a means for exceeding that amount. It is unclear from the data
whether the $18 maximum, with the accompanying framing of "we love
you," creates a focal point around which extremely generous purchasers
would still collect absent the constraint, or whether Magnatune would
earn more money if it allowed purchasers to input their own price at the
top of the scale, thereby capturing some additional hyper-generous con-
tributions. In any event, most of Magnatune's revenue comes from
purchasers seeking to behave as an "average" purchaser.
But see Henry S. Farber, Reference-Dependent Preferences and Labor Supply: The Case of
New York City Taxi Drivers, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 1069, 1069-82 (2008) (using data from New
York City Taxi Drivers to test a model that provides evidence suggesting that reference-
dependent preferences play a limited role).
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Histograms showing the percentage of total revenue on Magnatune from
each album bin.
C. Jonathan Coulton-Individual Artist Developing Cooperative
Relationship with Fans
Smaller-scale artists are also pursuing independent distribution of
their works through cooperative relationships with fans. Although coop-
erative distribution in this case may not involve direct monetary
payment, what we see in these relationships is that fans are making other
contributions in the form of time, labor, marketing, and artistic contribu-
tions. As with the voluntary payment schemes we analyze, artists who
successfully build supportive fan communities employ a range of design
levers that are worthy of close analysis.
Jonathan Coulton is a Brooklyn-based singer and songwriter who
produces and sells his music independently.23 The hub of Coulton's op-
eration is his personal website, JonathanCoulton.com, where he
communicates with fans, gives away free songs, and sells digital
downloads.'24 In addition to his personal site, Coulton also sells his work
through traditional outlets like Rhapsody, iTunes, and Amazon.com.'
123. See The JoCo Primer-General Info, JONATHANCOULTON.COM, http://
www.jonathancoulton.com/primcr/info/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
124. See id.
125. The JoCo Primer-Getting Music, JONATHANCOULTON.cOM, http://www.
jonathancoulton.com/primer/get/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2010).
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Coulton's website includes his online store, where he offers roughly
one-third of his music for free download, with a recommended price of
one dollar per track.126 The digital copies are DRM-free and come in
high-quality formats.127 All songs are sold under a Creative Commons
license, which grants consumers the right to share copies for non-
commercial use (among other permissions), thus empowering his fans to
promote his music and broaden his fan base, but also making any pay-
ment on the site strictly "voluntary," as it is not illegal for users to share
-128copies.
Coulton also offers another more unusual transactional option to his
fans-his online store invites fans who previously copied his music
without paying (using file-sharing networks or burning copies of his
CDs) to make a contribution. 129He frames this donation option under the
heading "Already Stole It?" and allows fans to contribute by purchasing
a robot, monkey, or banana icon with an accompanying message to the
artist (for example, "Many thanks for the awesome songs JC!" or "$10
for a monkey! When will it be delivered?"). 30
In contrast to the two other study sites, Coulton's entire distribution
and production effort is highly collaborative. He extends cooperation
beyond the storefront. Coulton's fans organize and promote live shows,
promote his music across the web, and even perform more mundane
functions (one fan reformatted Coulton's catalogue for karaoke compati-
bility, while another designed free graphics for Coulton's digital
albums).' Many fans have created music videos with his work and
posted them on YouTube.132 Coulton also maintains constant communica-
tion with his fans through both his blog and regular email contact,
responding to each and every one of more than one hundred emails he
receives daily.'33 The site also provides extensive forums where fans
126. The MP3 Store, JONATHANCOULTON.coM, http://www.jonathancoulton.com/store/




130. Id. Fans who purchase icons are considered members of the "JoCo Golden Circle."
Id.
131. See Spektugalo, JoCo UltraStar Karaoke Songs Voting, JoCo FORUMS (Nov. 8,
2008), http://www.jonathancoulton.com/forums/comments.php?DiscussionlD-945; The JoCo
Primer-More Awesomeness, JONATHANCOULTON.COM, http://www.jonathancoulton.com/
primer/more/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
132. Jonathan Coulton, YouTUBE, http://www.youtube.com/results?search-query=
jonathan+coulton&aq=f (last visited Nov. 22, 2010).
133. Clive Thompson, Sex, Drugs and Updating Your Blog, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2007,
at E42.
[Vol. 17:1
Everything in Its Right Place
introduce themselves, submit clips, and communicate about all things
Coulton.'34
Despite the fact that much of his material is available for free, Coul-
ton earns about $90,000 annually from voluntary donations and digital
downloads on his site.' This accounts for 70% of his overall revenue
from digital downloads, with the remainder coming from iTunes and
other online stores. Downloads represent about 40% of his overall reve-
nue. CD sales make up another 29%, and ticket sales from live shows
18%. The final 11% comes from T-shirts, typically purchased through
his website. Roughly 93% of revenues from website downloads are for
songs that can only be downloaded directly from his site upon payment.
These payments are "voluntary" in the sense that it would be easy and
legal (because of his licensing practice) for fans to copy and distribute
his music without payment. About 5.5% of store revenues are for pay-
ment for free songs (those you can download from the site itself without
payment), and another 1.35% comes from donations of monkeys or ba-
nanas at the online store. Coulton's case is notable for the amount of
revenue he is earning compared with the other sites under study.
TABLE 3
Jonathan Coulton Magnatune Siberry
Revenue to Artists $80-90k yearly $8-1 Ok yearly to $33k total
from Website top artists
The difference in earnings can likely be attributed to some combina-
tion of Coulton's relative popularity and his distribution and website
design. We discuss the design elements of Coulton's store in more detail
in Part V of this Article. However, what stands out most vividly is that
Coulton engages his fans in a more complex and multifaceted coopera-
tion dynamic, at multiple stages of his distribution strategy, apart from
the storefront.
The differing use of voluntary donations on Coulton's site is also no-
table. Coulton does not offer flexible payment options within his store.
Instead, he uses fixed prices for songs and then solicits donations, while
allowing fans to pay the one dollar fixed price for songs.16 The voluntary
donation strategy, which produces 6.65% of Coulton's revenue, does not
134. See JoCo FORUMS, http://www.jonathancoulton.com/forums/ (last visited Oct. 8,
2010).
135. Data on Coulton's earnings discussed in this Article is on file with the authors.
136. See The MP3 Store, supra note 126.
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appear successful when compared to the 90% of revenue that Magnatune
earns for payments of $8 or more, and with the rate of payment above
the minimum that Siberry collects. Given the significant fan dedication
harnessed by Coulton's site, there is reason to believe that implementing
a flexible payment system, rather than a donation or payment for free
songs strategy, would enable Coulton to capture significant additional
revenues. This recommendation will be explored further as we now look
deeper into the design of the voluntary payment systems on each site.
IV. DESIGNING FOR COOPERATION
Our data suggest that cooperative models based on voluntary contri-
butions to a public good produce meaningful results when compared to
industry baselines. A question of great practical significance to artists,
and of great theoretical significance to researchers interested in systems
designed for cooperation, is how to stabilize and extend this model so as
to improve its performance. How do we understand users who pay for
what they have already gotten for free? What leads people who have the
option of getting an album for $5 to pay $8 or even $16?
The past fifteen years have seen the emergence of a substantial
literature studying a range of deviations from the standard rational actor
model, and forming the foundations of an approach that provides useful
answers to these and related questions. Well-known legal scholarship in
this vein has spanned observational work on social norms and trust, 37
common property regimes,' and experimental behavioral law and
economics.'39 The better-known aspect of the experimental work has
been a divergence from the predictions of rationality itself.'4" Less well-
known is work that does not take aim at cognitive failures of rationality,
but rather challenges two core simplifications of rational actor theory
and mechanism design, neither entailed by rationality: that individuals
are motivated similarly, and that they are all self-interested.141 Instead, we
find that human beings have diverse motivational-behavioral profiles. In
experiments, more than half act cooperatively, while a substantial
minority, perhaps one-third, behaves as predicted by the standard
137. E.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 61, 77, 164-66, 247 (1991).
138. E.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS (James E. Alt & Douglass C.
North eds., 1991).
139. E.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).
140. Id.
141. See Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, Homo Reciprocans, 415 NATURE 125, 126
(2002).
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rational actor theory.14 2 Many are active reciprocators, responding
cooperatively to those who cooperate, and punishing, even at a cost to
themselves, those who behave uncooperatively.143 Others cooperate
unconditionally, whether because they are true altruists or solidarists, or
because they simply prefer to cooperate and do not measure what others
are doing.'" In addition to the experimental work and the observational
work on commons-based regimes and social norms, there is work in
social psychology'45 and neuroscience on social preferences, 46 such as
empathy 4 7 and solidarity, or in-group bias, 4 in the evolutionary
biology of cooperation,149 in management science and organizational
sociology on new collaborative models of production,'" in social
142. Three excellent review articles are Colin F. Camerer & Ernst Fehr, Measuring
Social Norms and Preferences Using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists, in
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN SOCIALITY 55, 60-65 (Joseph Henrich et al. eds., 2004); Ernst Fehr
& Herbert Gintis, Human Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical
Foundations, 33 ANN. REV. Soc. 43, 47-51 (2007); Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to
the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action, 92 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 1, 5-9 (1998).
143. Camerer & Fehr, supra note 142, at 60-65; Fehr & Gintis, supra note 142, at 47-
51; Ostrom, supra note 142, at 5-9.
144. Camerer & Fehr, supra note 142, at 60-65; Fehr & Gintis, supra note 142, at 47-
51; Ostrom, supra note 142, at 5-9.
145. E.g., Henri Tajfel & John Turner, An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict, in
THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33 (William G. Austin & Stephen
Worchel eds., 1979); Toshio Yamagishi et al., Bounded Generalized Reciprocity, Ingroup
Boasting and Ingroup Favoritism, 16 ADVANCES GROUP PROCESSES 161 (1999).
146. E.g., Tania Singer et al., Empathetic Neural Responses Are Modulated by Per-
ceived Fairness of Others, 439 NATURE 466, 466 (2006) (describing changes in empathy level
based on fairness of counterparty's play in a prisoner's dilemma game).
147. E.g., C. DANIEL BATSON, THE ALTRUISM QUESTION: TOWARDS A SOCIAL-
PSYCHOLOGICAL ANSWER (1991). Batson's work and responses to it produced a major contri-
bution to the literature on the psychology of empathy. More recently, there has been extensive
work on the biological foundations of empathy. See, e.g., Paul J. Zak & Jorge A. Barraza,
Empathy and Collective Action (Apr. 8. 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract= 1375059.
148. E.g., Helen Bernhard et al., Parochial Altruism in Humans, 442 NATURE 912
(2006); Marilynn B. Brewer, In-Group Bias in the Minimal Intergroup Situation: A Cognitive-
Motivational Analysis, 86 PSYCHOL. BULL. 307 (1979); Charles Efferson et al., The Coevolu-
tion of Cultural Groups and Ingroup Favoritism, 321 SC. 1844 (2008); Henri Tajfel et al.,
Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour, I EUR. J. SoC. PSYCHOL. 149 (1971); Jay J.
Van Bavel et al., The Neural Substrates of In-Group Bias: A Functional Magnetic Resonance
Imaging Investigation, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1131 (2008); Yamagishi et al., supra note 145.
149. E.g., Martin A. Nowak, Five Rules for the Evolution of Cooperation, 314 SCIENCE
1560 (2006).
150. E.g., THE FIRM AS A COLLABORATIVE COMMUNITY: THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
TRUST IN THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (Charles Heckscher & Paul S. Adler eds., 2006); Wal-
ter W. Powell, Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, in 12
RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 295 (Barry M. Staw & L. L. Cummings eds.,
1990).
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software and peer production online,"' and in social network theory on
how social dynamics influence behavior,5 2 all of which provide different
perspectives on why we cooperate, and what aspects of the systems we
inhabit influence the degree to which we cooperate.
It is inappropriate to claim that we can create a set of predictions
about human behavioral responses to various design interventions under
the claimed determinism of the traditional rational actor theory. But the
crispness of the theory was itself overstated. It is, nonetheless, feasible to
synthesize out of this range of materials a set of design interventions that
we can predict with some confidence will likely improve the quality of
cooperation.13
Communication
Communication plays a critical role in fostering cooperation. In doz-
ens of experiments, allowing participants to communicate with one
another predictably and reliably leads to higher levels of cooperation.M
Experiments also show that unstructured, fluid communication is more
effective than simply sending canned messages. Specifically, we use
communication to achieve several design levers discussed here, like trust
and humanization '1 and promise to cooperate even where the promise is
non-binding in the sense that there is no third-party enforcer.' 6 In obser-
vational work too, stabilizing and routinizing communication is a central
151. E.g., YOCHAi BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: How SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux
and "The Nature of the Firm," I12 YALE L.J. 369 (2002) [hereinafter Benkler, Coase's Pen-
guin].
152. E.g., Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large
Social Network over 32 Years, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 370-79 (2007) [hereinafter Chris-
takis & Fowler, Obesity]; James H. Fowler & Nicholas A. Christakis, Dynamic Spread of
Happiness in a Large Social Network: Longitudinal Analysis over 20 Years in the Framing-
ham Heart Study, 337 BMJ a2338 (2008); Nobuyuki Hanaki et al, Cooperation in Evolving
Social Networks, 53 MGMT. SC. 1036, 1036-50 (2007); Gregory Todd Jones, Heterogeneity
of Degree and the Emergence of Cooperation in Complex Social Networks, 10 EMERGENCE:
COMPLEXITY & ORG. 46, 46-54 (2008).
153. See Yochai Benkler, The Penguin and the Leviathan: The Science and Practice of
Cooperation (forthcoming 2011) (discussing implications of evolutionary, social, and psycho-
logical research to organizational, institutional, and technical design aimed at increasing
cooperation through leveraging empathy and solidarity, fairness and norms, and reciprocal
social dynamics).
154. See, e.g., David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 7 RA-
TIONALITY & SOC'Y 58, 58-92 (1995).
155. See, e.g., Olivier Bochet et al., Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Con-
tribution Experiments, 60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. I1, 11-26.
156. Olivier Bochet & Louis Putterman, Not Just Babble: Opening the Black Box of
Communication in a Voluntary Contribution Experiment, 53 EUR. EcON. REv. 309, 309-26
(2009).
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aspect of the new managerial processes.' 1 Communication is both a dy-
namic in its own right and a mechanism for producing the other design
levers. First, communication is a mechanism through which people come
to see their own goals, preferences, and policies in conversation with
others with whom they interact-a mechanism for endogenous creation
of prosocial motivations. Communications is also a foundational, and
often the most readily available and natural, mechanism for facilitating
most of the other design levers. The effect of communication is a very
robust finding in these literatures, and an obvious target for design inter-
ventions. It has a large effect in experimental work, and its routinization
is one of the core design principles of the organizational shift to collabo-
rative models.
Situational Framing
We cannot help but think of relations within frames of reference, and
these frames in turn shape the remainder of the decisional process. In
sociology, Erving Goffman called this aspect of interactions "frame
analysis."" In psychology, it is often called "situational construal" or
simply "framing." The baseline phenomenon is the same: we cannot
avoid interpreting a situation in which we find ourselves in social and
cultural terms. In this model, we are already at least partly determining
the nature of the interaction and our likely behavior in it. This aspect of
the interaction is like a lens through which we observe reality, and which
simply must exist; there is no unmediated mechanism of accessing a
situation that does not go through a lens of cognitive and social-cultural
framing. One particularly evocative experiment studied whether framing
a game by telling the subjects they were playing "the community game"
as opposed to telling them that they were playing "the Wall Street game"
would make a difference.' The study found that under an identical pay-
off structure, about 70% of subjects told they were playing "the
community game" cooperated for the duration of the experiments.'6
When subjects were told that they were playing "the Wall Street game,"
33% opened cooperatively, and the rest defected and continued to defect
throughout the game.'"' The framing choice in this case may have
157. See, e.g., Anabel Quan-Haase & Barry Wellman, Hyperconnected Net Work: Com-
puter-Mediated Community in a High-Tech Organization, in HECKSCHER & ADLER, supra
note 150, at 281-333 (describing communications flows in collaborative segments of a firm).
158. ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF Ex-
PERIENCE 1-20 (1st ed. 1974).
I 59. Varda Lieberman et al., The Name of the Game: Predictive Power of Reputations
Versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoners Dilemma Game Moves, 30 PERSONALITY
& Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1175, 1176 (2004).
160. Id. at 1177.
161. Id.
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informed subjects as to "the right thing to do," or it may have acted to
alter their predictions about what others would do, so as to make coop-
eration or defection a better strategy. But it clearly had a real effect on
behavior of otherwise similar populations encountering otherwise identi-
cal payoffs.
Empathy and Solidarity: Expanding the Set of Subjects Whose
Utility Matters
One of the first deviations from pure self-interest is our ability to
care about the payoffs to particular others as individuals, and our capac-
ity to care about payoff to a group that we see as constituting at least part
of our identity. These are, respectively, empathy and solidarity. One clear
experimental finding is that humanization-mechanisms to assure that
participants know and recognize the humanity of their counterparts-
improves the number of cooperators and the degree of "generosity" they
are willing to show others.16 Neuroscientific studies support the proposi-
tion that agents' brains respond differently to cooperation with humans
than to "cooperation" (that is, playing strategies that in game theory
count as cooperative) with computers. 6 1 Current neuroscience and neu-
rochemical analyses suggest that this effect is quite primitive, and likely
mediated by oxytocin uptake in the brain.'64 But treating other individu-
als as human beings generally, worthy of our concern, is only one of two
signals of the degree to which another is worthy of our cooperation or, at
least, is highly likely to reciprocate. The other major approach to trigger-
ing the recognition of other as close to oneself is group solidarity. There
has been substantial work in social psychology to support the finding
that people increase the degree to which they cooperate with strangers
whom they perceive to be part of even very minimally-triggered solidar-
ity groups. Experimental subjects in psychological experiments show
greater generosity to, and cooperation with, others who merely claimed
to share their preferences to Klee paintings over Kandinsky, and vice
versa,165 although more robust solidarity groupings offer a more stable
basis for sustained cooperation.' There continues to be substantial work
refining the degree of solidarity present, and the extent to which it is a
heuristic for reciprocity as opposed to something more foundational to
162. Iris Bohnet & Bruno Frey, The Sound of Silence in Prisoner's Dilemma and Dicta-
tor Games, 38 J. EcoN. BEHAV. & ORG. 43, 43, 53 (1999).
163. James K. Rilling et al., A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation, 35 NEURON 395,
395-96 (2002); James K. Rilling et al., Opposing Bold Responses to Reciprocated and Unre-
ciprocated Altruism in Putative Reward Pathways, 15 NEUROREPORT 2539, 2539-43 (2004).
164. See Zak & Barraza, supra note 147, at 2, 14.
165. See David G. Rand et al., Dynamic Remodeling of In-Group Bias During the 2008
Presidential Election, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. Sc. 6187 (2009).
166. See id.
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identity membership. 67 But the role of symbolically marked groups in
fostering cooperation is substantial in scholarship in human evolutionary
biology," in particular the anthropological work on the co-evolution of
genes and culture. 69 A similar dynamic, covered by the concept of "af-
filiation-based trust" in organizational sociology,170 is consistent with the
role of homophily in social networks,'7 ' and plays a significant role in
organizational psychology.7 2 The basic intuition is that either (a) the
more someone has a sense of being part of a team, the more one is will-
ing to sacrifice one's own good for the group, or (b) the clearer the
"groupness" of the group, the more likely cooperative action will be re-
ciprocated. Both empathy and solidarity, and their instigation through
face-to-face meetings or detailed descriptions of the background of par-
ticipants, are another important mechanism for design, and are directly
part of the dynamic of recognition.
Normativity: Fairness, Rights, and Norm Conformism
In his classic Rational Fools Amartya Sen emphasized the
importance of what he called "commitment" to human motivation, and
the failure of economics, by and large, to account for the possibility that
people act out of commitment.' Commitment should cover at least two
distinct concerns: what is fair and what is right. Indeed, a consistent
finding in the experimental literature is that fairness is endogenous to the
cooperative dynamic. People care about the fair distribution of
167. See id.; see also Joachim 1. Krueger & Theresa E. DiDonato, Social Categorization
and the Perception of Groups and Group Differences, 2 Soc. & PERS. PsYCHOL. 733, 741-45
(2008) (exploring whether solidarity is an internalized form of identity or a shortcut people
use to determine whether they are likely to interact with a person again, and therefore should
cooperate with them in expectation of future reciprocity).
168. See, e.g., Ernst Fehr et al., Egalitarianism in Young Children, 454 NATURE 1079-
1083 (2008); Rand et al., supra note 165.
169. See, e.g., ROBERT BOYD & PETER J. RICHERSON, CULTURE AND THE EVOLUTION-
ARY PROCESS (1985); PETER J. RICHERSON & ROBERT BOYD, NOT By GENES ALONE: How
CULTURE TRANSFORMED HUMAN EVOLUTION (2004).
170. See Lynne G. Zucker, Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Struc-
ture, 1840-1920, 8 RES. ORG. BEHAV. 53 (1986).
171. See generally Miller McPherson et al., Birds of a Feather: Homophily in Social
Networks, 27 ANN. REV. Soc. 415 (Aug. 2001).
172. See generally S. ALEXANDER HASLAM, PSYCHOLOGY IN ORGANIZATIONS: THE
SOCIAL IDENTITY APPROACH (2004) (claiming that fostering the creation of a social identity
among members in an organization, in particular employees of a firm, improves organizational
performance).
173. See generally Sen. supra note 96, at 317 (arguing that standard economics fails to
appreciate that we act in certain ways not only to advance material self-interest, but also to
follow through on our moral commitments, including where doing so undermines our material
self-interest).
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outcomes, 174 the perceived fairness of the intentions of others in the
interactions,7 and the fairness of the process of the interaction."' As we
will see, several of the sites seek to trigger a sense of fair action, between
fans and the artist and amongst the fans, as an element in the site design.
In addition to fairness, many of us also care about doing what is
right, that is to say, doing what is morally appealing. There is increasing
work today in cognitive psychology and neuroscience covering this basic
fact-that we have an emotional and subconscious rational need to do
what we understand to be moral.' Appeals to fairness or to doing what
is right, which we see in various tones on the music sites we study here,
are therefore not simply irrelevant whining, but appeal directly to con-
cerns that many of us have and experience as reasons for prosocial
action.
In addition to seeking to do what is fair and what is right, we also
have a widespread practice of doing what is just plain normal; that is,
conforming to social norms.7" The literature on social norms in law gen-
erally deals with long-standing, usually tight-knit communities, which
combine many of the design levers we describe here."" When contem-
plating the design for systems that may be as new as a collaborative wiki
launched yesterday, or in our case, musicians' sites, social norms must
play a different role. At a minimum, they refer not to long-standing in-
ternalized norms, but to instances of more-or-less clearly specified
behavioral expectations about what counts as "cooperative" in a given
system. Once participants know what counts as cooperation and what as
defection, they can adjust their own actions, as well as judge the actions
of others. In music, we have seen references to the "typical" or "aver-
age" amount donated, or a "suggested" price, playing this role. These
174. See Fehr & Schmidt, supra note 99, at 208 ("The evidence suggests that many
people are strongly motivated by other-regarding preferences, and that concerns for fairness
and reciprocity cannot be ignored in social interactions.").
175. See id. at 224-29; see also Armin Falk et al., On the Nature of Fair Behavior, 41
ECON. INQUIRY 20, 20-26 (2003) (describing experiments in which subjects were confronted
with outcomes that were unfair, but where it was sometimes clear that the other party had no
intention of treating them unfairly, and sometimes that the unfair treatment was the product of
intentional action, and showing that subjects responded differently to unfair intentions, cumu-
lative to unfair outcomes).
176. See Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law,
30 CRIME & JUST. 283, 284 ("[Pleople's reactions to legal authorities are based to a striking
degree on their assessments of the fairness of the process by which legal authorities make
decisions and treat members of the public.").
177. See generally HAUSER, supra note 97 (reviewing extensive literature on the cogni-
tive, emotional, neuroscientific components, and processes underlying moral capacities).
178. ELLICKSON, supra note 137, at 130, 149-55; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338,.343-52 (1998).
179. See, e.g., OSTROM, supra note 138 (the foundational text in the field).
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serve as Schelling coordination norms,""8 providing a focal point for
coordinating behavior. Beyond that, they can be explicitly stated expec-
tations about behavior, like the purely norm-based system that anchored
Wikipedia and made it unique among cooperation models in its early
days. There is evidence that norms that are self-consciously chosen by a
group enjoy high adherence with minimal enforcement requirements."
Where these norms evoke background norms that are already culturally
ingrained, they may enjoy the status of those already internalized norms,
or the norms can themselves be the object of enforcement through an-
other design lever, punishment.
Trust and Authenticity
Trust is the subject of its own immense literature, and has been used
in many different ways.1 2 Often, particularly in computer science, it is
used to characterize the success of a system that removes the possibility
of human defection or error."' That is the purpose of trusted computing
platforms. When used thus, "trust" is not a design lever at all, but rather a
description of the outcome of a system, which signifies confidence it its
performance. Trust as a design lever should be seen as an attitude or belief
of agents, not a condition they inhabit. It is a belief about how others in the
system will behave in the absence of constraint. That is, whether these
others are likely to be harmful or helpful to the trusting agent when not
forced to be helpful, or prevented from being harmful, by the system it-
self.14 Trust here means a factual belief held by individuals about the state
180. Thomas Schelling introduced the idea of a focal point for coordination in THOMAS
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54-55 (1960).
181. ELINOR OSTROM, Roy GARDNER & JAMES WALKER, RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON
POOL RESOURCES (1994).
182. See generally TRUST & RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS FROM EXPERI-
MENTAL RESEARCH (Elinor Ostrom & James Walker eds., 2005) (reviewing current work on
trust); TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS (Diego Gambetta ed., 1998)
(representing one of the earliest collections emphasizing trust); Iris Bohnet, Bruno S. Frey &
Steffen Huck, More Order with Less law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and Crowding
Out, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 131 (2001) (analyzing the dynamics of trust over time given vary-
ing institutional arrangements); Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective
Action, and Law, 102 MICH. L. REV. 71 (2003) (providing the first major analysis of how the
experimental literature on trust and reciprocity intersects with legal design).
183. See Helen Nissenbaum, Will Security Enhance Trust Online, or Supplant It? in
TRUST AND DISTRUST WITHIN ORGANIZATIONS: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES, ENDURING QUES-
TIONs, RUSSELL SAGE PUBLICATIONS 155-88 (R. Kramer & K. Cook eds., 2004), available at
http://www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/trust.pdf.
184. There is increasing evidence that this "state of mind" understanding of trust (as
opposed to a "state of affairs" concept) is mediated in the brain by oxytocin uptake. Zak &
Barraza, supra note 147, at 2, 12. For our purposes, the process is less important than the
extent to which it reinforces that trust as a design lever should be understood as a subjective
state of mind of agents in a system-a state that can be developed and aided by the system
design, but is not itself an objective characterization of the system.
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of the social system they occupy. Thus, we treat it differently than nor-
mativity. Trust as we use it here is not about the value of being
trustworthy, rather, it is about constructing a system in which people can
reasonably believe that some substantial number of others will not take
advantage of them whenever they can. Constructing a system that builds
this sense of trust will usually be facilitated by breaking down coopera-
tive actions into observable chunks, where participants can lower their
exposure to others while, for example, observing their proclivities to co-
operate or defect. A subset, or a requirement of trust, is that the person
constructing the cooperative system is regarded as an authentic actor.
The basic insight is simple: empty promises of community and coopera-
tion may trick others for a short time, but not over the long term. An
artist or label that wishes to engage a cooperative dynamic will need to
make a credible commitment and behave in a way that authentically ex-
hibits trustworthiness as a stable characteristic, as well as exhibiting trust
in other players.
Transparency and Reputation
Another important design element, the transparency of a system,
bears powerfully on the issues of both trust and punishment. Critically,
many of the other design features depend on participants knowing who
did what, to and with whom, to what effect, and by which mechanism.
Recognition of this dependence lies behind the argument that biologists
Nowak and Sigmund make about the evolutionary impact of moral ac-
counting (though they did not call it that); such accounting, they suggest,
was necessary to sustain indirect reciprocity, which in turn may have
been the driving force behind the evolution of human intelligence."
Whether or not they are correct, studies in experimental economics typi-
cally show that games in which subjects can develop and communicate
reputations lead to cooperation more quickly and robustly than anony-
mous games.8 6 Similarly, reputation systems play a significant role in
social software platforms, ranging from commercial systems like eBay
and Amazon.com, ,7 to the wide range of commons-based peer produc-
tion projects that deploy the possibility of creating a stable locus for
185. See Martin Nowak & Karl Sigmund, Evolution of Indirect Reciprocity, 437 NA-
TURE 1291, 1296-97 (2005).
I86. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gichter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods
Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980,986-91 (2000).
187. See Paul Resnick & Richard Zeckhauser, Trust Among Strangers in Internet Trans-
actions: Empirical Analysis of eBay's Reputation System, in II ADV. APPLIED MICROECON.
127 passim (Michael R. Baye ed., 2002).
[Vol. 17:1
Everything in Its Right Place
reputation, and observable behavior and opinion, as a major design
element.""'
Autonomy/Efficacy
There is significant psychological literature suggesting that people
need a personal sense of competence or efficacy in their actions, and
pursue activities that satisfy that need.'89 A central aspect of the reforms
initiated by the Toyota Production System had to do with decreasing the
number of process engineers, and locating greater autonomy to define
the specifics of execution of the task at hand in the hands of employees
in teams, on the line.'90 This need for autonomy and personal efficacy
then plays an important role in limiting the efficacy of reward and pun-
ishment as complementary, as opposed to competing, methods of
assuring cooperation. Efforts to assure and visibly permit personal
autonomy, and to illuminate the efficacy of contributions, appear to be
important to stabilizing levels of contribution.
Calculation: Punishment, Reward, Crowding Out and Cost
The first set of design levers all operate at the level of intrinsic moti-
vations. That is, they cause participants to want to cooperate for reasons
that are internal to their own psychological and social needs and desires,
rather than in response to external rewards or constraints. However, both
the observational and experimental work suggest a significant diversity
in motivational profiles, and a substantial presence of selfish actors.
Thus, stable cooperation systems require extrinsic motivations to keep in
line those not driven to cooperate by intrinsic motivations, and to prevent
the unraveling of cooperation in those situations (which are not all in-
stances of cooperation) where the presence of selfish actors can
undermine the efficacy, fairness, solidarity, or any of the other mecha-
nisms that might sustain cooperation among cooperators, even in the
presence of defectors. The presence and design of mechanisms for disci-
plining and punishing defectors are therefore important to the overall
design of cooperation platforms. The experimental literature finds that
(a) with the right design, reciprocators can solve the second-order public
188. See, e.g., Wikipedia: Barnstars, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Wikipedia:Barnstars (last visited Sept. 1, 2010); see also Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On
Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114
YALE L.J. 273, 292-95 (2004) (discussing aspects of SETI@Home that allow individuals and
teams to be seen as particularly high contributors).
189. See, e.g., Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The "What" and "Why" of Goal
Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior, II PsYCH. INQUIRY 227
(2000).
190. See Paul S. Adler et al., Flexibility Versus Efficiency? A Case Study of Model
Changeovers in the Toyota Production System, 10 ORG. Sc. 43, 54-56 (1999).
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goods problem of punishment without intervention from an external
body, such as the state or management,' 9' but (b) punishment can back-
fire if it is not properly designed, leading to deterioration.192 It is
important to understand that punishment does not collapse the analysis
back to selfish rationality. It is neither necessary (we see cooperation
without it) nor sufficient (we see instances where it reduces cooperation,
probably through crowding out) to explain cooperation. It can impose
such great costs on groups that the game is not worth the candle.'93 In
addition, the degree to which its effects are beneficial or detrimental var-
ies among cultures.194 But it remains one design lever available to
systems designers to improve compliance by selfish actors with the co-
operative behavior of the other agents in the system. While punishment
has been studied much more extensively, reward systems have a similar
and symmetric structure-participants pay a cost to keep the more self-
interested behavior of others in line with the common good. Analytically,
rewards are merely negative punishments. They also have the benefit of
not triggering spirals of mutual punishment.
The ambiguous effects of punishment bring to the fore one more
design focus, or constraint: the phenomenon of crowding out, or the non-
severability of motivational vectors. Crowding out refers to the situation
in which an intervention in one motivational subsystem (most impor-
tantly, affecting material interests through explicit incentives treatments,
in the form of reward or punishment), leads to opposite effects in other
motivational subsystems (such as affecting commitment to a project, or
moral commitment to a behavior).' 95 Intra-system crowding out refers to
situations where use of one design lever reduces the efficacy of another.
For example, the introduction of punishment can, under certain circum-
stances, crowd out trust, and thereby undermine, rather than improve,
cooperation.'" From the psychological literature, we know that even ex-
191. See Bowles & Gintis, Homo Reciprocans, supra note 141, passim; Fehr & Gachter,
supra note 94, passim.
192. Armin Falk et al., Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions, 73 ECONOMETRICA
2017, 2028-29 (2005); Ernst Fehr & Bettina Rockenbach, Detrimental Effects of Sanctions on
Human Altruism, 422 NATURE 137, 140 (2002).
193. Anna Dreber et al., Winners Don't Punish, 452 NATURE 348, 350 (2008).
194. Benedikt Herrman et al., Antisocial Punishment Across Societies, 319 SCIENCE
1362, 1363-64 (2008).
195. See BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR MONEY: AN EcONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL
MOTIVATION 25-26 (1997); Benabou & Tirole, supra note 90, at 908; Bruno S. Frey & Reto
Jegen, Motivational Interactions: Effects on Behavior, Samuel Bowles, Policies Designed for
Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine "The Moral Sentiments ": Evidence from Economic
Experiments, 320 SCIENCE 1605 (2008); 63/64 ANNALES D'ECONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE
131, 149 (2001).
196. Toshio Yamagishi, The Provision of a Sanctioning System as a Public Good, 51 J.
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 110, 114 (1986).
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plicit rewards can trigger the crowding out effect, but not as powerfully,
and that they may be susceptible to framing that will treat them as non-
controlling rewards.97 Inter-system crowding out can occur when one
tries to "mix-and-match" elements from cooperative systems with ele-
ments from other systems, such as market mechanisms. There is a broad
literature on crowding out caused by the introduction of money into oth-
erwise cooperation-based interactions.'" For the kinds of systems we are
studying here, crowding out presents a particularly salient problem, be-
cause the object of cooperation is payment in money. Given that we
observe many mixed systems, such as open source software innovation
and the introduction of cooperative models into firms, mixing is not im-
possible. But it requires attention to the interactions between the
motivational and organizational forms, rather than a simple assumption
of additive effect. *
In addition to punishment and reward, which operate primarily on
individuals who otherwise might not cooperate because of intrinsic
drives, it is important to remember that the existence of prosocial moti-
vations does not exclude consideration of personal costs and benefits.
The point is not that large numbers of us are altruists irrespective of cost.
Rather, it is that large numbers of us have prosocial motivations-regard
for others owing to empathy and solidarity, or regard for the normative
implications of what we do, in addition to our other cost-benefit consid-
erations. It is not surprising, therefore, that the cost of cooperation
affects its levels and the number of people who cooperate. In experi-
ments, subjects will cooperate more when the cost of doing so is lower,
such as when the opportunity cost of cooperating in a prisoner's di-
lemma is lower because of payoff structure,2 00 and in real life we see
improvements in peer production online when the task has been modu-
larized or chunked into sufficiently fine-grained modules to make the
cost of contribution smaller.20s
Social Dynamics
There is a growing body of research today in social network effects
on behavior. It turns out, for example, that our own obesity is affected by
197. Deci & Ryan, supra note 189, at 235.
198. See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON.
SURVS. 589 (2001); Bowles, supra note 195, at 1605-1609.
199. See Yochai Benkler, Beyond the Bad Man and the Knave: Law and the Interde-
pendence of Motivational Vectors, YALE LAW SCHOOL (Mar. 12, 2010), http://
www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/lntellectual Life/LTW-Benkler.pdf.
200. See, e.g.. Colin F. Camerer & Ernst Fehr, Measuring Social Norms and Preferences
Using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists, in FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN So-
CIALITY 55, 61-68 (Joseph Henrich et al. eds., 2004).
201. Benkler, Coase's Penguin, supra note 151, at 377-78.
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202
whether our friends and relatives have recently become obese. The
mechanism is not altogether clear, but it appears that there is at least
some role for benchmarking and imitation-that is, we judge our own
behavior and outcomes by comparing ourselves to others in our social
neighborhood.203 Allowing participants to observe each other (transpar-
ency), and to selectively form and break attachments with people who
are more-or-less cooperative (in order to increase the number of interac-
tions they have with cooperators as opposed to defectors), is therefore
also a valuable design feature in enabling groups of cooperators to stabi-
lize and provide mutual support.
Within social dynamics, leadership is important. This conclusion
does not come out of the experimental work, which does not examine
leadership, but it is a consistent feature of the organizational sociology,204
is often emphasized in the study of open source software,205 and has been
an object of study for field studies of online cooperation as well. 206 It is
important to recognize, however, that "leadership" does not mean "hier-
archy." Rather, what we see in the observational work is that people
contribute at widely diverse levels, and systems need to be designed to
accommodate these divergent patterns and to find fulfilling ways for par-
ticipants to be recognized for their asymmetric contribution, often
through greater say in the collective governance of the enterprise, or
through symbolic means of expressing honor and respect. Moreover, for
at least some people, it is precisely the seeking of positional power, and
recognition of leadership, that can drive generous and prosocial behav-
ior. The role of gift giving as a modality of asserting dominance, or
agonistic giving, is widespread in the anthropology of the gift,207 in fund-
raising practices where public exhibition of one's gift is a form of
asserting status, and we also see it in some, but by no means all, online
cooperation sites.
The following, then, is a list of the above design levers, or design
considerations:
202. Fowler & Christakis, Obesity, supra note 152, at 370.
203. See Hanaki et al., supra note 152, at 1036.
204. See MICHAEL MACCOBY & CHARLES HECKSCHER, A Note on Leadership in Col-
laborative Communities, in HECKSCHER & ADLER, supra note 150, at 469-478.
205. STEVE WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 166-71 (2004).
206. See, e.g., Mayo Fuster Morell, Governance of Online Creation Communities: Provi-
sion of Infrastructure for the Building of Digital Commons (Aug. 2010) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE) (on file with authors); Joseph M. Reagle Jr.,
Do as I Do: Authorial Leadership in Wikipedia, REAGLE.ORG (Oct. 2007), http://
www.reagle.org/joseph/2007/1 0/Wikipedia-Authorial-Leadership.pdf.
207. See, e.g., MAURICE GODELIER, THE ENIGMA OF THE GIFr 1-9 (Nora Scott trans.,
Univ. Chi. Press 1999).
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No list of fourteen potential loci of design intervention can hope to
provide the determinism implied by simpler models of human motiva-
tion and system intervention. For readers who seek the comfort of
analysis capable of stating "if you do X, you will increase rewards
through action A, and therefore increase compliance with the expected
behavior," what follows in Part V will be disappointing. Other readers
may recognize that human motivations and social, psychological, and
cultural interactions are extremely complex phenomena. They cannot be
reduced to a simple "if you do X then A will follow" without enormous
loss of information. Readers who accept this reality may be more patient
as we explore how the design levers still provide substantial advantages
over an approach that simply recognizes the complexity of human action
and calls for highly contextual analysis. In Part V, we suggest that the
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design levers indeed offer some greater purchase to explaining and pre-
dicting results, provide analysis of diverse design decisions, and offer
suggestions for design improvements in discrete cooperative activities-
like voluntary payment music websites.
V. USE OF DESIGN LEVERS IN INTERFACE
DESIGN IN STUDY SITES
This section seeks to demonstrate how the levers can be imple-
mented in practice by analyzing the study sites. In so doing, we highlight
the differences in design choices across the sites, and gain insight into
which designs are more conducive to cooperation. Naturally, the sites
presented here represent only one set of ways in which the levers could
be implemented.
For example, a site might aim to build empathy among users and
humanize an artist by detailing an artist's personal story and enabling the
artist to communicate with fans through a blog or email. Alternatively,
rather than aggregating and publishing this information unilaterally, a
website might give fans tools to upload testimonials and stories of an
artist. Both mechanisms achieve a similar goal of humanizing the artist,
but they do so through different design interventions. Here we detail and
compare the design decision employed on each of the study sites while
also suggesting alternative implementations.
Communication
Despite the salience of communication as a cooperation-enabler,
most communication on Magnatune and on Siberry's site is unidirec-
tional. The sites are not built as social networks with active profile
messaging, internal emailing, chat rooms, or other user interaction. In-
stead, messaging flows from the owners to fans, and there is little robust
fan-to-fan or artist-to-fan dialogue. On Magnatune, for example, the site
founder keeps a blog where he regularly messages the community, but
*2081community posting on blog posts is limited.
By contrast, Coulton's site includes active community forums that
contain over one thousand discussion threads. 209 The forums are adminis-
tered by volunteers and require all contributors to sign in before
posting. 2 10 As predicted by cooperation theory, what we see in these fo-
rums is a community that actively discusses its relationship to Coulton
and to the broader project of cooperative music distribution. The fans
208. See Buckman, Magnatune Memberships, supra note 117.
209. See JoCo FORUMS, supra note 134.
210. See id.
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engage with the various payment options that Coulton presents and share
their views on acceptable behavior.
For example, in a thread called "Payday," fans directly respond to
Coulton's payment proposition:
Lots of [my music] is freely available depending on how techni-
cal you are-you can get all of it for free if you really try. But
please remember I do make a living this way, so if you like what
you hear I'd certainly appreciate you throwing a little payment
or donation my way. If you can't afford it, for goodness sake
please send copies of everything to all of your friends. 2'
The responses to this request range in character. Here are a few re-
sponses seen in the "Payday" thread:
"People should donate/pay what they feel the music deserves,
and if you can't afford to pay money, it is ok to pay in your time
and effort in spreading the word of how awesome this music is."
"Well people that enjoy his music, download it, and never give a
penny should feel guilty. If you can afford an internet connec-
tion, you can afford to pay something."
"His intentions seem pretty clear to me. He'd like you to pay for
it, but he'd rather you take it for free than not take it at all. Just
spread it around, and he knows eventually money (poop?) will
come back to him. I've given him money for music & concert
tickets, but I always sort of feel like I haven't given him nearly
enough to cover all the entertainment he's provided me. I do
'promote' him by giving people CD's, sending youtube [sic]
links, talking about his music to anyone who'll listen,
etc......[sic]" 212
What we see throughout these comments and the broader discussion
is that fans use the forums to present themselves and identify as part of
the cooperative community. The community tools are then used to dis-
cuss the question of voluntary payment and define norms and practices.
It is thus the provisioning of the communications tools that allows this
conversation about fairness to develop and enables fans to see them-
selves as connected to a broader community of purchasers.
211. The JoCo Primer-Getting Music, supra note 125.
212. Payday, JoCo FORUMS, http://www.jonathancouIton.com/forums/comments.php?
DiscussionlD =1139 (last visited Nov. 19, 2010).
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Situational Framing
All three of the sites under study frame the exchange of music as more
than a monetary transaction. Purchasing music becomes an opportunity to
participate in something greater. It is a chance to support an artist, to
give a gift, and to remedy the problems in the music marketplace.
That said, the frame used and the method of communicating the
frame differs from site to site. On Magnatune, visitors are invited to take
part in the launch of a new music label and a new way of distributing
music. The framing takes place through the Magnatune tagline, "We are
not evil . .. . You get great music, musicians get 50%," the labeling of
the different levels of payment, and the founder's detailed explanation of
Magnatune's creation.2 3 Specifically, after detailing the difficulties his
wife experienced as an independent musician, Buckman explains:
I thought: why not make a record label that has a clue? That
helps artists get exposure, make at least as much money [sic]
they would make with traditional labels, and help them get fans
and concerts.
If you think Magnatune is a worthy goal, please support it. There
are powerful forces who want it to fail, so I need your help if
this is going to work.214
Coulton, by contrast, takes fans out of a pure transactional context
by framing the site as a music community. He invites fans to participate
throughout the site but then warns, "listen to my music, be part of my
community, but remember I make my living this way."215 Furthermore,
rather than emphasizing duty or obligation, Coulton expresses apprecia-
tion for contributions and invites reciprocity. For example, when he
explains how fans can "get music" he writes, "[i]f you like what you
hear I'd certainly appreciate you throwing a little payment or donation
my way. If you can't afford it, for goodness sake please send copies of
everything to all of your friends." 216
As with Coulton and Magnatune, Siberry frames the relationship as
one of implicit obligation. The site characterizes the free download op-
tion as a "gift from the artist,"217 signaling that, as in any gift context, a
formal quid pro quo is neither required nor expected, but a moral and
social obligation is incurred. This framing may offer a mixed signal: on
213. Why We Are Not Evil, supra note 103.
214. Buckman, Founder's Rant, supra note 100.
215. The MP3 Store, supra note 126.
216. The JoCo Primer-Getting Music, supra note 125.
217. See supra note 81.
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the one hand, the artist leaves the decision on contribution entirely to the
consumer, without threat of punishment, shaming, or even disapproval-
an uninhibited expression of trust in those that visit the online store. On
the other hand, as anyone who has received a gift knows, the trust comes
with an expectation and a social performance of reciprocation. Signals
on the site are further mixed because, contrary to the decidedly non-
market framing of the site overall, Siberry calls her "standard" payment
rate a "market price," and describes her system as having a "flexible
price interface."2 " This designation likely misaligns the framing of con-
tributions on her site, at least to some extent. Future work would be
required to examine whether a more tightly aligned set of messages
would result in lowering the percentage of non-participants. It is hard to
tease out, however, whether the relatively high level of non-participation
we observed on Siberry's site is a result of her site design's capacity to
actually capture and observe those non-participants (unlike Coulton and
Magnatune), or whether the levels of non-participation are affected by
the mixed messaging.
Empathy and Solidarity
The sites vary in the degree to which they enable empathy and soli-
darity. In all three sites, the founders use personal messaging,
photographs, and stories to humanize themselves and the artists. For ex-
ample, Magnatune uses a video to introduce artists.2"9 It gives the artists
an opportunity to present themselves, explain why they joined, and speak
about what Magnatune represents to them.
Coulton also induces solidarity through his framing of the site. How-
ever, while all three sites do a decent job of building solidarity and
empathy between the founder and fans, or between artists and fans
(Magnatune), only Coulton enables building of solidarity among the fans
themselves. Magnatune in particular seems to seek ingroup solidarity in
the face of an outgroup threat, with Buckman's plea for help in the face
of unnamed outsiders who are resisting Magnatune's efforts. 22 0 Solidar-
ity, measured in the experimental literature as ingroup bias, may well
have its roots in inter-group conflict,221 of which the oppositional trigger
is a telltale sign.
218. Id.
219. Nicolis Amado, Magnatune in Six, MAGNATUNE (Dec. 18, 2006), http://www.
magnatune.com/six.
220. Buckman, Founder's Rant, supra note 100 ("If you think Magnatune is a wonhy
goal, please support it. There are powerful forces who want it to fail, so I need your help if
this is going to work.").
221. Bowles & Gintis, supra note 191, at 125-28.
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Given the literature on solidarity, it is possible that both Magnatune
and Sheeba could enhance levels of contribution results if they enabled
fans to build "teams" or "groups" that would participate and contribute
as teams, as part of the larger enterprise of supporting the artists. There
is, however, some uncertainty about the extent to which this effect is
gender biased and male specific. 2 2 Either site could design for solidarity-
creation by enabling Coulton-style forums. However, merely allowing
fans to post pictures of themselves, submit comments, or express their
own identities and connection to the site might be enough to cultivate
this "team spirit."
Normativity: Fairness, Moral Commitment and Norm Compliance or
Conformism
All three sites appeal heavily to a sense of fairness and community
norms. However, what distinguishes the communities is whether the sites
attempt to set norms of fairness independently or whether they invite
users to consider their own sense of fairness when deciding how much to
contribute.
For example, Siberry's explicit (and idiosyncratic) pitch, displayed
on the site's "Frequently Asked Questions" page, appeals to core fairness
principles even as it makes clear that the freedom to decide compensa-
tion questions rests with the consumer. She writes:
WHAT ARE SELF-DETERMINED TRANSACTIONS?
A flexible interface that accommodates all transaction needs.
It ensures that money (or lack of it) never comes between the




NOT tests of your integrity
NOT giving music away for free
IS a flexible price interface
222. See Jung-Kyoo Choi & Samuel Bowles, The Coevolution of Parochial Altruism and
War, 318 SCIENCE 636 (2007); Rand et al., supra note 165, at 6190.
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IS respectful of our wider senses of balance
IS non-policing
IS a way of treating others as we would like to be treated
IS trusting that the world is good and so are people
IS acknowledgement that our creative gifts are just that. Gifts to
us. Wanting to share them is the ultimate thank you back to the
source.
OK, BUT HOW DO I DO IT?
You decide what feels right to your gut. $100? $20? $1? Let
your gut guide you. If you download as a gift from artist, per-
haps you'll buy an extra CD at another band's concert. Or if you
don't go with your gut feeling, you might sleep poorly, wake up
grumpy, put your shoes on backwards and fall over. Whatever.
You'll know what to do.223
This appeal implicates several insights from the cooperation litera-
ture. It explicitly eschews enforcement, emphasizing "non-policing," and
the artist's desire to avoid imposition of "guilt trips." It explicitly evokes
fairness on the golden rule model, trust, and reciprocal gift giving.
Moreover, it attempts to trigger customer behavior that coheres with
one's own understanding of what constitutes fair conduct, rather than
imposing an external behavioral norm.
The site prominently displays the average price per song, which may
destabilize the non-market character of the interaction, but also effec-
tively translates the actual consumer behavior into a guidepost for
fairness. The notion here appears to be that publication of summary sta-
tistics sets an expectation of community behavior that then influences all
other transactions on the site. As the coordinating price point displayed
on the site is reflective of actual community behavior (as opposed to a
unilateral command from the artist), the average price may perform a
normative function, in the sense of a clear signal for imitation and con-
formist norm compliance.
As discussed in the Magnatune results section, clustering of the ma-
jority of payments around a value labeled "typical" is evidence of how
behavior can be influenced by reporting and tagging of community
223. Frequently Asked Questions, SHEEBA, supra note 81.
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payment trends. On Magnatune, the "typical" price reported also reflects
the average price seen in the data.
In addition to the tagging of the payment options in normative terms
(i.e., typical, generous, very generous) Buckman also tries to establish a
norm of "fair sharing," permitting and encouraging users to share only
three copies of the music they download.224 The "give three copies" norm
stands in contrast to industry norms, where file sharing is generally
treated as illegal and even immoral. The norm also differs from those of
file-sharing communities, where unabashed and unlimited sharing is of-
ten seen not only as acceptable but also as beneficial to the artist. In
these ways, the norm is more permissive than the baseline in much of the
music sharing world. But the "give three copies" policy is also more re-
strictive than one more baseline: the actual legal license that governs the
relationship.
Because all Magnatune files come with a Creative Commons li-
cense, users are legally permitted to share them without limits, as long as
they do not do so commercially. Yet Buckman does not mention the legal
standard. Instead, he "overlays" his own norm of what constitutes "fair
sharing" of Magnatune files. It is unknown whether Magnatune users
recognize whether this "give three copies" norm is in fact a norm rather
than the legal standard, and, indeed, a norm that is more restrictive than
their actual rights. Nevertheless, Buckman admits to receiving regular
letters from users who, in an attempt to scrupulously "play by the rules,"
seek guidance regarding the official sharing policy.225
Trust, Authenticity, Transparency, and Reputation
Although both Magnatune and Siberry's site display some aggre-
gated sales data, none of the sites approach full transparency with
respect to revenues. In addition, none of the sites provide high-paying
contributors or active fans with a clear platform for developing a reputa-
tion or identity on the site. In this regard, the sites do not seek to harness
social signaling, "Big Man" giving dynamics, or the generation of a
reputation for generosity. All three sites do make a point of communicat-
ing trust in their respective fan bases and therefore invite trust in
themselves and their sites.
At a macro level, by making all of her music available for free,
Siberry makes herself vulnerable and expresses a tacit trust in the good
will of consumers. The site's basic approach signals to consumers that
the artist carries a certain level of confidence in their willingness to con-
tribute to her well-being.
224. See Give 3 Free Copies, supra note 102.
225. Email from John Buckman, supra note 112.
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Magnatune's framing of its "give three copies" policy also seeks to
foster trust. In detailing the reasoning behind the policy, Buckman ex-
plains that he created the policy in part to reciprocate and reward
customers who emailed to ask about making copies.226 Responding to
"[a]ren't you worried I'll abuse this," Buckman writes:
No, because you've always had the capability to copy anything
you bought from Magnatune: we don't believe in copy protec-
tion and we think you're honest, otherwise you wouldn't be
bothering to read this!
Dishonest people can always abuse the system. Rather, we want
to reward all the honest people who truly want to do the right
thing.
If you abuse our generosity, we're not going to break down your
door and throw you in jail. We just want you to feel a little guilty
about it <grin>.
We're trusting you to do the right thing, and introduce new peo-
ple to the music you love. You'll feel good about it, your friends
227will thank you, and you'll help Magnatune prosper.
It is within this exchange between Buckman and his customers that
the use of trust as a design tool is clearly exemplified. What is no less
important is the attention to the interplay between norms and humaniza-
tion. The addition of "<grin>" in this paragraph acts to moderate the
moral claim made on the other, to humanize it, and to make it a low-
threat demand. The site invokes "guilt" and internalized norms, but
diffuses the potential crowding out or negative effect of feeling forced
with a "<grin>."
Autonomy/Efficacy
Coulton's delegation of duties such as arranging his performances,
and his responsiveness to successful organizational efforts, 228 enable his
fans to feel that their relationship has an effect on Coulton. However, the
other sites do not appear to utilize the autonomy or efficacy levers. Mag-
natune and Siberry could communicate the impact of voluntary
contributions more clearly to induce deeper cooperation. Matching-type
gifts (for example, "if $X would be raised in Y time, I will donate $Z")
are one example of an efficacy-enhancing design intervention. As it
226. See Give 3 Free Copies, supra note 102.
227. Id.
228. See JoCo UltraStar Karaoke, supra note 13 1; The JoCo Primer-More Awesome-
ness, supra note 131.
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stands, the average fan has no way of assessing whether the community
contributions as a whole are sufficient to support Siberry or the Mag-
natune artists.
Calculation: Punishment/Reward, Crowding out, and Cost
None of the sites under study use punishment or reward systems to
influence behavior. The cost of participation and potential for crowding
out, however, differs from site to site.
Siberry and Coulton may be triggering some level of motivational
"crowding out" through their pricing schemes. The $0.99 price data
point (labeled on Siberry's site as the "market price")229 and the $1.00
price point230 frame the artist-customer relationship as an arms length
market exchange, reminiscent of iTunes and other fixed-price online mu-
sic stores. The $0.99 and $1.00 frames thus orient the customer to a
standard recording industry convention, and could deter some customers
from considering more substantial contributions. Coulton and Siberry
would potentially drive higher contributions and avoid presenting their
music as part of a broader commoditized industry if they eliminated
prices that trigger clear market associations for music consumers.
The marginal transaction cost of contribution relative to download-
ing may also limit Coulton and Siberry's revenues. At Magnatune,
consumers must pay something in order to download high-quality album
files. Thus, if they want music at all, they must already take out a credit
card or log into PayPal, and are within the payment context when decid-
ing whether to contribute more than the minimum. The incremental
transaction costs associated with adding a couple dollars to the purchase
price are negligible. Radiohead employed a similar approach, requiring
purchasers to pay the minimal transaction cost of the download to obtain
a "free" copy, making the marginal cost of contributing negligible.23 1 On
Coulton's site, some songs require payment but provide no flexibility to
pay more than the fixed price, whereas those songs that require no pay-
ment and give room for voluntary donation see the full cost of
transacting borne by generous giving.23 2 In Siberry's case, any payment
entails its full transactions cost, because all songs are also available at
much lower transaction cost through the "gift from the artist" or "pay
213
later" options.
229. See supra note 81.
230. See The MP3 Store, supra note 126.
231. Flick, Radiohead: In Rainbows to Be Given Away on October 10, PUDDLEGUM
(Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.puddlegum.net/radiohead-in-rainbows-to-be-given-away-on-
october-10/.
232. See The MP3 Store, supra note 126.
233. Jane Siberry Opens a Window, supra note 71.
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Social Dynamics
Finally, two of the study sites are not designed in a way that enables
social dynamics among contributors to evolve in any significant way.
Coulton's forums and media contribution tools do allow "leading" fans
to emerge and interact with the community, as demonstrated in the
thread about online payment. However, Magnatune and Sheeba's site
lack the basic profile and communication tools that would allow fans to
have an online presence. In this sense, communication tools and other
design features (like profiles, images, etc.) can be understood as a pre-
cursor for the emergence of leadership or social dynamics on a site. It is
therefore worth noting that the cooperation sustained on Siberry and
Magnatune is primarily sustained due not to inter-fan social influence,
but to the influence and leadership of the site founders, and the use of the
other design levers discussed.
CONCLUSION
Paying for music production and distribution, like paying for the
production of other information goods, is a classic public goods prob-
lem. Copyright law, and the industrial model of the recording industry of
the twentieth century, provides one solution to the problem.
However imperfect a property-like right in a market in information
goods may be (it was Kenneth Arrow who first identified systematic im-
perfections),2 3 copyright accepts the tradeoff in order to induce the
creation of culture because, in theory, the benefits outweigh the costs. As
digital music distribution destabilized the recording model's core en-
tity-the disc, be it phonograph or CD-it created new opportunities for
appropriation and threats of misappropriation, all of which have led to
the copyright wars and the diverse legislative and judicial efforts to pre-
serve the twentieth century model of paying for music. 235 Because music
files were small and easily transmissible over the Internet at acceptable
fidelity, by comparison to video files, and because the industry had so
narrowly focused its revenue streams around selling units, rather than
public performances and multiple channel appropriation, like video pro-
duction and film, the music industry experienced the threat earlier than
234. See Kenneth Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Innova-
tion, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609 (Richard Nelson ed., 1962).
235. See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT (paperback ed. 2006): SIVA
VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY (2003); FISHER, supra note 47; JAMES BOYLE, THE
PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND (2010).
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other copyright industries, and the threat was more credibly claimed to
be terminal.
It is not, therefore, too fanciful to say that the threats to, and needs
of, the music industry were the primary driving force in the rapid expan-
sion of digital copyright law: from legislation like the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act and the No Electronic Theft Act in 1998, to
the Napster and Grokster cases of the current decade. More creative
thinkers have come up with novel methods for delivering money to art-
ists, including strong pre-commitment mechanisms to assure sufficient
donations like the street performer protocol 23 6 and forcing mechanisms
like a tax on Internet-related objects and services (whose proceeds would
go to copyright holders from a central clearinghouse, based on meas-
urements of the social value of the artist's work through market-like
consumption measures).23 7 But throughout this period, artists, cryptogra-
phers, and others were devising ways to enable artists to make a living,
rather than permitting industry to retain its business models.
Our study suggests that voluntary donation systems are, in fact, a po-
tentially stable alternative for providing artists with an anchor of support,
though in most cases likely not a complete solution to the problem of
artist compensation. However, royalties from recorded music were never
the primary means for most musicians to make a living before the digital
revolution. Live performances and, to a lesser extent and for fewer art-
ists, merchandising, played that role in popular music, while public
funding and philanthropy filled some of the shortfall for classical music
and jazz. The question from the artists' perspective, then, is not whether
voluntary payment systems can become a sole source of revenue, but
whether they are a plausibly stable element in a range of strategies for
supporting the production and distribution of music, while making an
acceptable living. Our answer, both theoretically and practically based
on the results of this study, is yes.
Theoretically, copyright in particular, and property-based solutions
to public good provisioning problems more generally, are built on an
assumption of universal self-interest. Here, we provided a brief survey
and synthesis of an expansive literature, theoretical, experimental, and
observational, that challenges the realism of that assumption. Scholarly
work across many disciplines suggests that human beings are diversely
236. See John Kelsey & Bruce Schneier, Electronic Commerce and the Street Performer
Protocol (1998), available at http://www.schneier.com/paper-street-performer.pdf.
237. See FISHER, supra note 235, at 8-9; Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncom-
mercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2003);
see also James Love & Tim Hubbard, Paying for Public Goods, in CODE: COLLABORATIVE
OWNERSHIP AND THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 207 (Rishab Aiyer Ghosh ed., 2005) (developing a
different version of an alternative compensation scheme).
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motivated, and that very large portions of us reliably exhibit behaviors
better explained by prosocial motivations than by uniform and universal
self-interest. From this work, we have extracted a series of design levers,
or design focal points, which seem to be associated with increased levels
of prosociality. We have used prosociality to mean contributing to the
provisioning of the public good, music, by paying artists, and in Coul-
ton's case, taking on some of the costs of marketing and distribution, as
well as performance production.
Empirically, we have presented a unique dataset, spanning between
three and five years, across three distinct websites, and analyzing over
150,000 discrete transactions. Our core findings are that:
(a) prosocial contribution levels are steady and reliable over that
period;
(b) depending on the design of the site, somewhere between
20% and 60% of fans can be relied on to contribute some-
thing;
(c) contributions are driven, it appears, by two distinct groups-
norm followers, or normative contributors, who seek to con-
tribute what is widely perceived as the norm, or their fair
share, and a much smaller set of hyper-generous altruists,
who contribute sufficiently large amounts to account for a
significant source of the revenues, though not as large a
portion as the normative contributors;
(d) the revenue flow generated by these contributions, even at
the low end of participation rates, as with Siberry, is signifi-
cant when compared to industry baselines of similarly
non-high-profile artists, and anecdotal evidence from Radio-
head and NIN suggests that the model may well scale to
more popular artists as well;
(e) the sites we examine in this Article specifically eschew forc-
ing models: they trigger reciprocity by making the music
available under a Creative Commons license that unilaterally
disarms them from any legally forcing mechanism, and they
do not use negative norm enforcement, through shaming or
guilt-trip inducements; rather, they rely on explicit expres-
sions of trust, both symbolic and actual, in terms of format
and licensing in which the music is made available;
(f) while the sites we reviewed are successful, there is no
exposition on "best practices," but instead a theoretically-
informed effort to explore cooperative design; the voluntary
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donation model is at a very early stage of its development,
explorations are heuristic and practical, and there is likely
substantial room for improvement as we begin to move our
design focus from perfecting means of control, monitoring,
and forced pricing, to perfecting systems that engage fans
with artists and enable prosocial dynamics to form a re-
placement system to support artists and pay for the public
good they produce.
Our study suggests several discrete potential improvements in the site
design:
Framing Take site visitors out of a purely transactional/
commercial mindset. Clearly explain that the site and artists therein
are supported through voluntary payments.
Invite visitors to join the community and appeal to norms of fairness,
reciprocity and trust in the site community.
Empathy & Solidarity Create a way for artists to humanize and introduce themselves
through text, images, and video.
Enable communities to form within the site-through groups or teams.
Allow fans to post media about themselves and create identities.
Normativity Don't just appeal to general norms-define what is and isn't fair
within a particular site. State community rules. Specify what is the
"typical,""above average," or "generous" payment point, or expose
data so that contributors can evaluate their contributions in
comparison to others.
Trust, Authenticity, Invoke the concept of trust and enable site visitors to know that both
Transparency, & Reputation site owners and artists are trusting visitors to consume fairly.
Highlight the lack of required payment or other expressions of trust.
Reveal data on payments and revenue shares with artists to
encourage trust of site owners.
Autonomy / Efficacy Enable artists to respond to requests and communications from
fans.
Post the results of voluntary payments and frame the impact they
have on artists.
Consider matching programs in which fan contributions are matched
by other organizations or entities.
Calculation: Punishment If pricing is used on the site, keep it unconventional. Don't trigger
& Reward, Crowding market behavior by using standard market prices: i.e., $0.99.
Out, & Cost. Minimize the cost of contributing. Require payment for processing
and offer options for additional voluntary payment after visitors are
already in the payment context.
Allow multiple mechanisms for payment, so visitors can select the
least costly option. Minimize time spent and complexity so that
regular submission of voluntary payments is not burdensome.
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Social Dynamics Create a structure for community leaders and representatives to
& Communication emerge and guide the community.
Enable bidirectional communication for all actors on the site. Employ
social tools including email, chat, Twitter, and others to enable a fan
culture and community to evolve. Allow fans to view and comment
on the behavior of others.
Enable fans to shape this environment-the visual look and feel of
the site, and the communication tools employed.
Future research should focus on experimenting with these design in-
terventions in controlled conditions and carefully monitoring outcomes.
Doing so will produce measurable evidence as to the effect of specific
interventions, and more concrete guidance for cooperative-systems
builders.
Copyright policy in the last two decades has been driven by the in-
terests of the copyright industries, and underwritten intellectually by a
model that suggests that musicians will not create without being paid,
and fans will not pay without being forced to by law and technology.
Theoretical and empirical work on prosociality, however, argues that
these assumptions are false, or at the very least, substantially incomplete.
There is extensive evidence that people do contribute to the public good,
and do act generously towards each other, in ways that suggest that mu-
sicians will create music beyond its marginal money value, and more
importantly for our purposes here, that fans will pay well beyond what
they can be forced to pay under present and foreseeable future techno-
logical conditions.
Taking these insights seriously requires a retreat from forcing and
punishment as the dominant mode of financing creative production. It
requires artists to engage their fans, and to understand themselves in a
reciprocal relationship, rather than an entitled one. It gives us breathing
space to experiment with new models of music production and distribu-
tion. But keeping the space for experimentation requires a technological
and legal environment that is conducive to sharing music in social ex-
change networks, rather than in tight technical and transactional
networks. Achieving that goal requires lawmakers and judges to resist
the claim-typically advanced by panicked music industry lobbyists and
lawyers-that the day on which the copyright system is loosened will
become the day the music died.
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